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A century ago, the famous economist Joseph Schumpeter suggested that innovation is 
a critical dimension of economic change. In line with this idea, we argue that innovation 
in the pharmaceutical industry is also a critical issue for human health and well-being 
(e.g., finding a cure for the COVID-19 should improve the well-being of many people 
across the world). 
To develop new drugs, pharmaceutical firms invest important resources in 
research and development (R&D). For instance, in 2019, these investments amounted 
to $2.4 trillion around the world (R&D World, 2020)1, which represents about 15% of 
their global sales (EFPIA, 2018).2 R&D investments have two specific characteristics: 
a long-term horizon and a high risk. Indeed, it usually takes around 10 years to launch 
a new drug, and there is only a limited number of successful R&D projects 
(Buonansegna et al., 2014; Petrova, 2014; DiMasi et al., 2016). 
From an academic point of view, these two key characteristics may lead to 
severe agency conflicts between managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Indeed, it is possible that managers underinvest in R&D, because they do not 
hold well-diversified portfolio, and they are usually relatively old. Thus, they may be 
more interested by short-term results and, therefore, cut R&D investments to avoid 








 In such context, a first key question arises: How can investors influence the 
R&D strategy of pharmaceutical firms, in order to create value in the long run?  
The first chapter of the thesis tackles this issue, by analyzing the impact of 
corporate governance on R&D investments in pharmaceutical firms. More precisely, 
we investigate whether a R&D committee established at the board level influences the 
R&D strategy of pharmaceutical firms. Based on a sample of 157 U.S. and European 
firms, we find a positive association between the existence of a R&D committee and 
R&D intensity, the numbers of products in clinical trial development, approved drugs 
by the FDA, and acquisitions of pharmaceutical firms. Our staggered difference-in-
differences supports the idea of a significant change in R&D strategy after the creation 
of such a committee. These findings hold after reweighting the treatment and control 
groups with entropy balancing. However, when comparing U.S. and European firms, 
we find that R&D committees only influence the R&D strategy of U.S. firms, which are 
often criticized for their short-termism. In European countries, where short-termism 
is less problematic, R&D committees have a merely symbolic value. Our results 
therefore suggest that R&D committees significantly influence the R&D strategy of 
pharmaceutical firms, and curb short-termism. 
Given that many pharmaceutical firms form R&D alliances to access knowledge 
and to share the costs and risks associated with the development of new drugs, a 
second key question arises: Do investors really benefit from such strategy? 
We tackle this issue in the second chapter of the thesis. More precisely, we 
investigate the expropriation risk (i.e., the risk of extraction of private benefits by 
large firms) faced by small firms that form an alliance with large firms. Our empirical 
analysis is based on a sample of 544 hand-collected announcements of successes 
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(good news) and failures (bad news) in clinical trials, during the period 2011-2017, 
and on two measures of market reaction (i.e., cumulative abnormal returns and 
abnormal trading volumes). We find a positive (negative) market reaction to good (bad) 
news in the latest stage of product development (i.e., Phase III), which is expected as 
uncertainty about future payoffs is much lower. Moreover, a stronger market reaction 
is found in the absence of a R&D alliance, which is also expected as all costs, benefits, 
and risks are borne by the large pharmaceutical firm alone. Finally, if an alliance exists, 
a larger market reaction is found for clinical trial announcements involving another 
large firm, in comparison to announcements involving small (non-listed) firms. Overall, 
the expropriation risk faced by small firms seems low from the investors’ point of view, 
suggesting that these firms have enough bargaining power to protect themselves with 
effective contractual arrangements, but also that large firms may not extract private 
benefits, in order to protect their reputation and to attract other small allies in the 
future. 
Finally, given that investors react to clinical trial disclosure by pharmaceutical 
firms, a last key question arises: Does this specific non-information influence the 
target prices computed by financial analysts?  
We tackle this issue in the third chapter of the thesis. In line with the well-
documented base-rate fallacy, which suggests that people tend to ignore the base-
rate information (i.e., general information on the probability of success of clinical trials 
and its consequences on future cash flows in our case) in favor of the new and specific 
information (i.e., clinical trial disclosures in our case), we expect that analysts become 
more optimistic (pessimistic) after the disclosure of information concerning the latest 
(earliest) phase of drug development because the probability of success (failure) is 
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higher. Our empirical examination confirms that Phase III (Phase I) disclosures lead to 
more optimistic (pessimistic) target prices. Our findings hold after controlling for the 
probability of success of the drug portfolio, analyst following, the seasonality and the 
frequency of analyst reports, and the intensity of clinical trial disclosure. Finally, some 
differences exist between large and small firms, as optimistic target prices are issued 
by analysts after Phase III disclosures by large firms, but after Phase II disclosures by 
small firms. Overall, our findings suggest that analysts become more optimistic after 
the disclosure of specific non-financial information by pharmaceutical firms and, 
therefore, supports the existence of a base-rate fallacy among financial analysts. 
Thus, this thesis provides three main results on the causes and consequences 
of R&D investments by pharmaceutical firms. First, R&D committees have a significant 
influence on R&D strategy. Second, investors of large pharmaceutical firms react more 
significantly to news regarding drug development (i.e., clinical trial disclosure) in the 
absence of an alliance, especially if the alliance involves a small firm. Third, analysts 
also react to clinical trial disclosure, by significantly modifying their target prices, 
suggesting that such specific non-financial information is an effective substitute for 
the “deficient” financial reports. 
By investigating three different questions, with various databases and 
methodologies, we hope that our findings will be valuable for investors, managers, and 
board of directors of pharmaceutical firms, as well as for researchers interested by 








Investing in R&D is a key decision for firms evolving in the pharmaceutical industry. 
The European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (2018) 
highlights that this industry invests more in R&D than other R&D intensive industries, 
such as software and computer services or technology hardware and equipment. For 
investors, such investments are important as they lead to the development of new 
products that may increase future cash-flows and firm value (Eberhart et al., 2004; 
Wang et al., 2017; Zhang and Toffanin, 2018). This idea is supported by academic 
research showing a positive financial market reaction to announcements of additional 
R&D investments or other good news regarding the development of new drugs by 
pharmaceutical firms (Ely et al., 2003; Dedman et al., 2008; Szutowski, 2018).  
However, some pharmaceutical firms invest less in R&D than others, which may 
notably be explained by the two key characteristics of R&D investments: high risk and 
long-term horizon. Managers, who do not have well-diversified portfolios and have a 
shorter time-horizon (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; O’Connor and Rafferty, 2012; 
Balsmeier et al., 2017) may limit R&D investments.3 In this case, the board of directors 
plays a key role by proposing appropriate long-term compensation to a CEO  (Cheng, 
2004; Deutsch, 2007; Brown et al., 2008; Lim, 2015), and by advising and monitoring 
the CEO’s efforts regarding R&D strategy (Adams et al., 2010).  
 
3 This argument derived from agency theory is challenged by behavioral economics. In 
particular, Hirshleifer et al. (2012) mention that overconfident CEOs may invest too many 
resources in R&D (i.e., overinvestment). 
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Previous literature has shown that the board of directors’ effectiveness depends 
on its composition (Lu and Wang, 2015; Ghosh, 2016; Helmers et al., 2017; Faleye et 
al., 2018). To the best of our knowledge, however, no study has yet examined whether 
the organization of the board influences managers’ decisions to invest in R&D. We fill 
this gap by investigating the impact of R&D committees on R&D strategy. Such 
committees have been established at the board level in many pharmaceutical firms 
over the two last decades.4 They are mainly composed of board members with a 
scientific background (i.e., a medical or pharmaceutical education), and advise the 
board of directors on R&D projects and monitor R&D investments as well as the drug 
development process.5  
We also examine whether the national context moderates the association 
between R&D committees and R&D strategy. Hillier et al. (2011), Shao et al. (2013), 
and Iturriaga and Lopez-Millan (2017) show that firms’ R&D related decisions are 
driven by national context. In this paper, we are concerned by the long term orientation 
of a country (Hofstede et al., 2010), which is a trait of the national culture and which 
may significantly impact R&D strategy (Shao et al., 2013). In particular, public firms in 
the U.S. are often criticized for their short-termism (Drucker, 1986; Martin, 2015)6, a 
view that is supported by some academic research (Graham et al., 2005; Chakravarty 
 
4 R&D committees are specific to the pharmaceutical industry. An exploratory analysis of other 
industries, via the BoardEX database, suggests that only 12 companies in various industries 
have implemented a similar committee at the board level during our period of interest. 
5 Table 2 describes the characteristics of R&D committee members and Appendix C provides 
some examples of R&D committee objectives. 
6 Even the United Nations indicate that short-termism is an issue for public firms: “The short-
term performance pressures on investors result in an excessive focus on quarterly earnings, 
with less attention paid to strategy, fundamentals and long-term value creation. Many 
companies respond to these pressures by reducing expenditures on research and development 





and Grewal, 2011; Sampson and Shi, 2020). In Europe, short-termism seems less 
problematic. Thus, we compare U.S. and European firms to better understand whether 
R&D committees have a different impact in distinct national contexts. 
Our empirical analysis is based on a sample of 157 pharmaceutical firms during 
the period 2010-2018. Our main findings are as follows. First, we show a positive 
association between the existence of a R&D committee and R&D intensity, the numbers 
of products in clinical trial development, approved drugs by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), and acquisitions of pharmaceutical firms. Second, our staggered 
difference-in-differences supports the idea of a significant change in R&D strategy 
after the creation of such a committee. When compared to firms without a R&D 
committee (i.e., our control group), firms that have established a R&D committee (i.e., 
our treated group) invest more in R&D, have higher numbers of products in clinical 
trial development, have a higher number of approved drugs by the FDA, and make 
more acquisitions of other pharmaceutical firms. Third, our findings hold after 
reweighting the treatment and control groups with entropy balancing, which allows 
greater comparability of our two groups of firms (Hainmuller, 2012). Fourth, the 
comparison between U.S. and European firms shows that significant changes in R&D 
strategy only occur in U.S. pharmaceutical firms. In European firms, R&D committees 
merely have a symbolic value. Overall, we conclude that R&D committees have a real 
impact on R&D strategy in the U.S., a country which is characterized by a short-term 
orientation, but they have no significant impact in European pharmaceutical firms in 
which short-termism is less problematic. 
By highlighting the importance of the board of directors’ organization, our paper 
contributes to the literature on the effect of corporate governance on R&D strategy. 
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Our paper is the first to show that R&D committees established at the board level 
significantly impact R&D strategy in the pharmaceutical industry, after controlling for 
board composition (Deutsch, 2007; Osma, 2008; Dalziel et al., 2011; Yoo et al., 2015; 
Chen et al., 2016; Ghosh et al., 2016; Midavaine et al., 2016; Rossi et al., 2017; 
Balsmeier et al., 2017; Helmers et al., 2017; Jia, 2017; Chen et al., 2018; Faleye et al., 
2018, Lu et al., 2018; Oh et al., 2018). In line with Hillier et al. (2011), Shao et al., 
(2013), and Iturriaga and Lopez-Millan (2017), we also show that the effectiveness of 
such a committee is sensitive to the institutional context. It has significant economic 
consequences in the U.S., a country characterized by (and criticized for) short-
termism, but it has only a symbolic value in European countries that have a long term 
orientation. Overall, these findings should be of interest to investors. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is dedicated to the 
literature review and the development of our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the 
research design and the sample. Section 4 presents our results. We conclude in the 
last section. 
1.2. Literature review 
1.2.1. The determinants of R&D strategy 
Since R&D investments are risky (i.e., the probability of not finding a new drug is high), 
with a long term horizon (i.e., it takes about 10 years to launch a new drug), managers 
of pharmaceutical firms, who are generally more risk averse than shareholders, may 
limit such investments (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; O’Connor and Rafferty, 2012; 
Balsmeier et al., 2017). It has been argued that a reduction in R&D expenses helps 
disclose higher earnings, which may satisfy financial analysts in the short-run and lead 
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to higher CEO compensation (Cheng et al., 2004; Cao and Laksmana, 2010; Lim et al., 
2015; Shon and Yan, 2015).  
Prior literature has identified various mechanisms that lead managers to invest 
more resources in R&D. Some of these mechanisms are related to the institutional 
context such as shareholders’ legal protection (Hillier et al., 2011), national culture 
(Shao et al., 2013), or tax regulations (Brown and Krull, 2008). Corporate governance 
also influences managers’ decisions regarding R&D intensity. In particular, the board 
of directors can encourage managers to invest more in R&D.7 
Dalziel et al. (2011) indicate that directors with Ivy League education and 
technical experience increase the R&D spending of the firm. Midavaine et al. (2016) 
show that education and gender diversity within the board lead firms to invest more in 
R&D, and that tenure diversity decreases R&D. Chen et al. (2016) find that female 
directors improve risk management related to R&D, as they reduce the positive 
association between R&D and future performance volatility. Board interlocks also have 
a positive impact on R&D intensity (Helmers et al., 2017). Oh et al. (2018) suggest a 
mimetic behavior for CEOs serving as directors on other boards. Lu and Wang (2018) 
argue that higher board independence enhances firm R&D. Faleye et al. (2018) indicate 
that having directors with industry expertise increases R&D investments. Finally, Chen 
et al. (2018) add to the gender diversity research and show that higher female board 
representation positively affects R&D effort. All previous papers are based on U.S. 
data. 
 The literature in other countries is less extensive but generally supports the 
results found in the U.S.. Osma (2008) analyses British firms and shows that having 
 
7 Appendix A provides a selected list of articles focusing on this issue. 
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higher board independence reduces the probability that firms will cut R&D. Schmid et 
al. (2014) argue that German family firms invest more in R&D than non-family firms. 
Yoo et al. (2015) investigate South-Korean firms and find that a higher presence of 
outside directors does not influence a firm’s R&D policy. Ghosh et al. (2016) find that 
commercial-bank directors invest less in R&D in India. In Italy, the presence of women 
on boards decreases R&D intensity (Rossi et al., 2017). Finally, De Massis et al. (2018) 
study Chinese firms and suggest that a higher presence of family directors positively 
affects R&D investments.  
 Overall, the academic literature suggests that board composition influences 
R&D strategy. To the best of our knowledge, however, no study has yet investigated 
the impact of board organization, especially the role of R&D committees established at 
the board-level, on R&D strategy.8 
1.2.2. R&D committees in the pharmaceutical industry 
In the pharmaceutical industry, many firms have established R&D committees over the 
last decade. Such organization of the board is probably favored by the large financial 
resources invested in R&D as well as by the specific drug development process in this 
industry (Petrova, 2014; DiMasi et al., 2016). Bringing a new product to the market 
usually takes more than 10 years and costs about USD 2.5 billion (DiMasi et al., 2016).9 
[INSERT FIGURE 1] 
 
8 The literature on board organization focuses on audit committees. It has notably been shown 
that the presence of such committees impacts financial reporting quality (Bédard and Gendron, 
2010), but their impact is sensitive to the institutional context (Poretti et al., 2018). 
9 Figure 1 shows that the first step of new drug development consists in a pre-clinical phase, 
which usually takes between 3 to 6 years. Companies then start their clinical trials, which lead 
them to test the medicines on humans during three different phases. This second step is the 
most expensive, as pharmaceuticals have to tackle all the safety and secondary outcomes of 
the treatment related to the new drugs. Finally, when a firm succeeds in Phase III, the new drug 
must be approved by the competent market regulator (e.g., the FDA in the US). 
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A R&D committee established at the board-level may provide advice and 
improve the monitoring of R&D investments and the drug development process. Such 
a committee, which includes members sitting on the board of directors with a scientific 
background (i.e., a medical or pharmaceutical education), discusses strategic and 
operational issues related to R&D during additional meetings. Appendix C provides 
some examples of R&D committees’ objectives described in the annual reports of 
pharmaceutical firms. They vary from generic (e.g., “Advise and monitor R&D” at 4SC) 
to more specific objectives (e.g., “Responsible for reviewing and monitoring R&D 
projects, programs, budgets and risk related to company's portfolio” at Qiagen). 
One may therefore argue that a R&D committee impacts R&D strategy because 
the members sitting on such a committee have strong incentives (i.e., their reputation 
is on the line, and they receive a specific compensation) to improve R&D policy. 
However, one may also argue that such a committee only has a symbolic value, because 
the R&D committee does not necessarily reflect the point of view of the board of 
directors, which is the ultimate decision-maker regarding the R&D policy. In addition, 
members with different profiles and objectives may sit on the R&D committee, which 
may lead to some cognitive conflicts regarding R&D policy. Overall, these various 
arguments (pros and cons) lead us to formulate our first non-directional hypothesis: 
H1: Ceteris paribus, the existence of a R&D committee does not influence R&D 
strategy. 
We also focus on the influence of the national context on the association 
between a R&D committee and R&D intensity. Based on Hillier et al., (2011), Shao et 
al., (2013) and Iturriaga and Lopez-Millan (2017), we posit that the effectiveness of a 
R&D committee may be sensitive to a country’s long term orientation, which is a key 
12 
 
national cultural trait (Hofstede et al., 2010). However, it is not clear in which context 
the R&D committee matters the most. On the one hand, it is possible that a 
complementary effect exists, meaning that R&D committees exert more influence on 
R&D strategy in countries with a long term orientation. On the other hand, it is also 
possible that a substitution effect exists, meaning that such a committee may curb 
short-term orientation. This issue is particularly relevant in the U.S., where public 
firms are often criticized for their short-termism (Drucker, 1986; Martin, 2015). Some 
academic research supports this idea (Graham et al., 2005; Chakravarty and Grewal, 
2011; Sampson and Shi, 2020). In Europe, short-termism seems less problematic. 
Thus, we compare U.S. and European firms to better understand whether R&D 
committees have a different impact in distinct national contexts. Since the effect is not 
clear, we formulate the second hypothesis as follows: 
H2: Ceteris paribus, the national context influences the association between a 
R&D committee and R&D strategy. 
1.3. Research design 
1.3.1. Sample 
To select our sample, we started with all pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms listed 
on U.S. and European markets from 2010 to 2018. We focus on U.S. and European 
firms because they possess a very large market share of the global pharmaceutical 
market (EFPIA, 2018). We began in 2010 to avoid any specific effects of the global 
financial crisis. We dropped all firms that were not listed during the full period as well 
as companies without all necessary financial data in Thomson Reuters. We also 
dropped firms for which we were unable to verify the existence of a R&D committee 
in their annual reports. Our final balanced sample includes 157 firms over nine years, 
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representing 1,413 firm-year observations. The existence of a R&D committee and its 
composition (i.e., independence, gender, age, and scientific culture of the members), 
as well as the presence of a chief scientific officer in the top management team, were 
hand-collected in the annual reports of these firms.  
Table 1 reports the sample distribution by country and by sub-groups. The 
three groups are based on the existence of a R&D committee. The first group includes 
80 firms without a committee during the full period (NEVER; 51% of the sample). The 
second group includes 33 firms with a committee during the full period (ALWAYS; 21% 
of the sample). The last group includes 44 firms that created a committee between 
2011 and 2018 (CREATION; 28% of the sample). When splitting our sample by national 
contexts, U.S. and European firms represent 65% and 35% of our sample, respectively. 
Table 1 also confirms that the U.S. is more short-term oriented (LTO=26) than 
European countries (LTO ranging between 51 and 83). 
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
1.3.2. Models 
We start with a cross-sectional analysis of the association between the existence of a 
R&D committee and R&D strategy. Our first equation writes as follows: 
R&Di,t = α0 + α1 RDC_EXISTENCEi,t + CONTROLSi,t + ɛi,t   (Eq. 1) 
RDC_EXISTENCE is equal to one if a firm has a R&D committee during the year, 
and zero otherwise. Our first hypothesis suggests that α1 is not different from zero, 
whereas our second hypothesis suggests this coefficient is different from zero in the 
two sub-samples of U.S. and European firms. 
Table 2 shows the characteristics of the existing R&D committees for the full 
sample and for U.S. and European sub-samples. On average, such a committee includes 
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about 4 members (RDC_Size), which represents about 46% of all board members 
(RDC_Board); 89% of them are independent and 82% have a scientific background. 
Moreover, they are relatively elderly (about 62 years old), and only a small proportion 
(18%) of women (RDC_Gender) are present on R&D committees. When comparing the 
two sub-samples of U.S. and European firms, some significant differences appear 
regarding these characteristics. 
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
We also analyze the impact of the creation of a R&D committee on R&D strategy 
with a staggered difference-in-differences design. In this approach, we compare firms 
from groups CREATION (treatment group) and NEVER (control group). Our second 
equation is the following: 
R&Di,t = β0 + β1 RDC_CREATIONi,t + β2 POSTi,t + β3 RDC_CREATIONi,t*POSTi,t 
+CONTROLSi,t + ɛi,t       (Eq. 2) 
RDC_CREATION is equal to one if a firm creates a R&D committee during the 
year, and zero otherwise. POST is equal to one for the years after the creation of a 
R&D committee, and zero otherwise. In this model, the variable of interest is 
RDC_CREATION*POST, which captures the marginal effect of R&D committee creation 
on R&D strategy. Our first hypothesis suggests that β3 is non-significant. Our second 
hypothesis suggests that this coefficient is different from zero in the two sub-samples 
of U.S. and European firms. 
 In all models, we include country and year fixed effects to control for year and 
country invariant and unobservable factors. The statistics are based on robust standard 
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errors clustered at the firm level (White, 1980; Petersen, 2009). Finally, we winsorize 
our variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles to minimize the effects of outliers.10 
1.3.3. Dependent variables 
Since no consensus exists in the literature regarding the appropriate measure of R&D 
strategy, we use six variables that capture various dimensions of that strategy. The 
first three variables concern R&D intensity: (1) natural logarithm of R&D expenses 
(RD_Log); (2) ratio of R&D expenses to total assets (RD_TA); (3) ratio of R&D 
expenses to sales (RD_Sales).11 For the last variable, we observe that some firms have 
very low levels of sales. To avoid extreme values, we follow Zhang et al. (2018) and 
test our hypotheses on a subsample of firms whose R&D expenses are not larger than 
their sales. Three other variables concern: (4) the number of products in development 
(Products); (5) the number of products approved by the regulator (FDA); (6) the 
number of acquisitions of pharmaceutical firms (M&A). 
Descriptive statistics from Panel A in Table 3 show that firms in our sample 
have average R&D expenses of $639.5 million, and average RD_TA and RD_Sales 
ratios of 23% and 25%, respectively. Their pipeline includes about 12 products, but 
only 1 drug is approved by the FDA, confirming the low probability of success of R&D 
projects (DiMasi, 2000). Finally, our sample firms acquire a pharmaceutical company 
every two years. Panel B shows that firms with a R&D committee (ALWAYS) have 
significantly larger R&D expenses than firms without such a committee (NEVER), as 
 
10 All variables are summarized in Appendix B. The variance inflation factors (VIF) for all our 
variables are inferior to 1.65, suggesting that multicollinearity is not an issue in our empirical 
analysis. 
11 Accounting treatment of R&D investments differs between US GAAP and IFRS, as the latter 
allows the capitalization of a portion of R&D investments, under specific circumstances (see 
IAS 38). Thus, we also summed the expensed and capitalized portion of R&D to measure R&D 
intensity. Our (untabulated) results are similar as the capitalized portion of R&D is small. 
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well as more products in their pipeline, more drugs approved by the FDA, and are 
involved in more acquisitions in the pharmaceutical industry. Finally, when compared 
to European firms, Panel C highlights greater RD_TA and RD_Sales ratios and more 
acquisitions in the group of U.S firms, but a lower number of products in the pipeline 
and drugs approved by the FDA. 
[INSERT TABLE 3] 
1.3.4. Control variables 
We incorporate several control variables to capture other possible determinants of 
R&D intensity (Osma, 2008; Hillier et al., 2011; Shao et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2016; 
Balsmeier et al., 2017; Rossi et al., 2017; Chen et al., 2018; Lu and Wang, 2018). CSO 
is a dummy variable taking the value of one if a Chief Scientific Officer (CSO) is a 
member of the top management team, and zero otherwise. Family_Firm, is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the firm is classified as a family firm, and zero otherwise. 
CEO_Change is a dummy variable equal to one if the company changed its CEO during 
the year, and zero otherwise. CEO_Age is the age of the CEO. BoD_Independence is 
the proportion of independent directors to the total number of directors. BoD_Gender 
is the proportion of female directors to the total number of directors.  
We also control for the financial characteristics of the firms. Market_Value 
represents the size of the company, measured as the natural logarithm of market 
capitalization. The market-to-book ratio (M_B) captures growth opportunities. 
Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. ROA is the operating income divided 
by total assets. PPE_TA, which captures firms’ investment capabilities, is calculated 
as the property, plant, and equipment to total assets. Finally, we include Listed_Years, 




1.4.1. Existence of a R&D committee 
We start with a cross-sectional analysis to capture the association between the 
existence of a R&D committee and our three measures of R&D intensity. Table 4 
presents our findings for the full sample, as well as for the two sub-samples of U.S. 
firms (Sub-sample 1) and European firms (Sub-sample 2). Using the two sub-samples 
allows us to evaluate more precisely the effect of a R&D committee in countries that 
have a more (i.e., European countries) or less (i.e., U.S.) long term orientation. 
[INSERT TABLE 4] 
 Table 4 shows a strong and positive impact of the existence of a R&D committee 
on our three measures of R&D intensity for the full sample. Firms with such a 
committee experience an increase of 6.7% and 7.1% in the ratios RD_TA and RD_Sales, 
respectively. However, the analysis of the two subsamples shows that our previous 
results hold only for U.S. firms, as we observe no significant association between the 
existence of a committee and R&D intensity in European firms. Our findings therefore 
suggest that R&D committees put more pressure on managers to increase R&D 
investments in countries with a short-term orientation, which supports the substitution 
effect.  
Table 5 shows the results with the other variables capturing R&D strategy: (1) 
the number of products in development (Products); (2) the number of products 
approved by the regulator (FDA), and (3) the number of acquisitions (M&A).12 We find 
a strong and positive association between the presence of a R&D committee and these 
 
12 We obtain the data on Products from ClinicalTrials.gov, on FDA from FDA.gov, and on M&A 
from Thomson Reuters M&A (SDC). 
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three variables of R&D strategy for the full sample. Thus, firms having a R&D 
committee have more products in development, more drugs approved by the regulator, 
and are involved in more M&As (i.e., acquisition of other pharmaceutical firms). On 
average, companies with a R&D committee report an increase of 27.5% in the number 
of products in development (Products), an increase of 7.6% in the number of approved 
drugs by the regulator (FDA), and an increase of 11.6% in the number of acquisitions 
of pharmaceutical firms. Such an impact is significant given the competitive nature of 
the pharmaceutical industry, where producing a novel drug becomes more and more 
challenging (DiMasi, 2000; DiMasi et al., 2016). Again, the analysis of the two 
subsamples supports a significant association between R&D committee and R&D 
strategy in the U.S., but not in Europe.  
[INSERT TABLE 5] 
1.4.2. Creation of a R&D committee 
Our second analysis helps to better capture the causal relation between the R&D 
committee and R&D strategy. We take advantage of the fact that some companies 
create such a committee during our period of interest and implement a staggered 
difference-in-differences design. More precisely, we use 44 sample firms that created 
a R&D committee between 2011 and 2018 as a treatment group (CREATION), and the 
80 firms that did not have such a committee as a control group (NEVER). Our variable 
of interest in this approach is RDC_CREATION*POST, which captures the marginal 
effect of R&D committee creation on R&D intensity.13  
In the first model of Table 6, we observe a significant and positive effect of the 
creation of a R&D committee on R&D intensity. This finding holds with our three 
 
13 In our empirical model, POST variable is absorbed by the year fixed effects. In the 
(untabulated) analysis, we ran our regressions without year fixed effects and our results hold.  
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measures of R&D intensity, and suggests that the creation of a R&D committee leads 
to an increase in R&D investments, representing 6.9% of the RD_TA ratio in 
comparison to firms that did not have a R&D committee. However, this effect is also 
sensitive to the national context. The findings with the two sub-samples support 
previous findings. The creation of R&D committees influences R&D intensity only in 
U.S. firms. In European firms, such a committee has a merely symbolic value. 
[INSERT TABLE 6] 
In Table 7, we replicate our difference-in-differences analysis with the other 
measures of R&D strategy. The findings for the full sample also suggest a strong and 
positive influence of the R&D committee on these measures. This is the case for 
Products and FDA, which suggests that firms creating a committee are more effective 
in terms of the number of products in development and the number of approved drugs 
by the regulator. It is also the case for M&As, suggesting that firms that create a R&D 
committee acquire more firms in the pharmaceutical industry. Finally, the results on 
the full sample hold again for the subsample of U.S firms, but not for the sample of 
European firms. 
[INSERT TABLE 7] 
1.4.3. Entropy balancing 
Given that the characteristics of our treated and control groups are different in our 
difference-in-differences design, we also employ entropy balancing to adjust for the 
observable characteristics of companies with and without a R&D committee 
(Hainmuller, 2012). In firms without a R&D committee, the descriptive statistics in 
Panel B of Table 3 suggest a less frequent presence of CSO (CSO), less concentrated 
ownership (Family_Firm), older CEOs (CEO_Age), less independent boards 
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(BoD_Independence), and less gender-diverse boards (BoD_Gender). Additionally, 
firms are smaller (Market_Value), less profitable (ROA), younger (Listed_Years), and 
with lower market opportunities (M_B).  
This matching procedure differs from propensity score matching (PSM), by not 
confining the analyses to subsamples of observations which could affect the estimates 
of the average treatment effect (Hainmuller, 2012; Shipman et al., 2017). However, 
entropy balancing requires identifying a set of continuous weights for each 
observation, such that the first, second, and third moments of the distributions of the 
treatment and control group will become indistinguishable. The weights generated by 
entropy balancing are employed in the weighted regressions.  
Table 8 shows that this matching procedure yields similar results to those 
provided in Tables 4 and 6. We report a positive and significant association between 
R&D committee and our three measures of R&D intensity for the full sample. Thus, the 
coefficients remain significant after controlling for observable differences between the 
two groups. By analyzing the effect of the institutional context, the presence of a R&D 
committee is still positively and significantly associated with R&D intensity in the U.S., 
whereas such a committee still has a symbolic value in European countries, where 
long-term orientation is less problematic. Finally, the results in Table 9 for our three 
other measures of R&D strategy with entropy balancing are also in line with previous 
results. 
[INSERT TABLE 8] 
[INSERT TABLE 9] 
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1.4.4. Discussion of the results 
Our various analyses suggest that the existence or the creation of a R&D committee 
has a positive impact on R&D strategy, as well as on the number of products in 
development, the number of drugs approved by the regulator, and the number of 
acquisitions announced by firms. Thus, our findings do not support our first hypothesis 
stating that there is no influence of R&D committees on R&D intensity. This hypothesis 
is based on the existence of some advantages and some limitations associated with 
such committees. It finally seems that real (and positive) economic consequences are 
associated with the existence of R&D committees. 
However, we also find that a R&D committee only matters in the U.S., a country 
characterized by short-termism (Drucker, 1986; Graham et al., 2005; CFA Institute, 
2006; Chakravarty and Grewal, 2011; Martin, 2015; Sampson and Shi, 2020). This 
result does not support our second hypothesis, especially the hypothesis of a 
substitution effect. In other words, R&D committees may curb short-termism, but do 
influence R&D strategy in countries with a long-term orientation (i.e., countries in 
which short-termism is less problematic).  
We also note that one control variable is highly significant in our models: the 
presence of a chief scientific officer (CSO) in the top management team. In our cross-
sectional analysis (Tables 4 and 5), we find a positive and significant effect in all cases 
(full sample, U.S. firms, and European firms). This result holds with our difference-in-
differences design (Tables 6 and 7), for the entropy balancing approach (Tables 8 and 
9). More work is therefore needed to understand when a CSO has a real impact on 
R&D strategy.  
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Finally, the two variables capturing the board’s composition are not very 
significant in our various models, suggesting that the organization of the board matters 
more than the composition of the board for R&D policy. In other words, having a R&D 
committee composed of members with a scientific background matters more than 
having a board composed of independent members or women. 
1.5. Conclusion 
This paper investigates the impact of R&D committees established at the board level 
on the R&D strategy of 157 pharmaceutical companies. It is motivated by the 
importance of R&D investments in this industry, in which it takes several years to 
develop a new drug for which the risk of failure is high. These two characteristics 
(long-term horizon and high risk) may lead managers to limit R&D investments and, 
ultimately, to reduce shareholders value creation. Thus, it is interesting to better 
understand whether the organization of the board, especially the presence of a R&D 
committee, may impact managerial decisions to invest more resources in R&D. 
Our main results suggest that firms with a R&D committee invest more in R&D. 
These are robust to several analyses (cross-sectional analysis, difference-in-
differences design, and entropy balancing). We also find that firms with a R&D 
committee have a higher number of drugs in development, a higher number of approved 
drugs, and a higher number of acquisitions of pharmaceutical firms, confirming a 
positive impact of such a committee on firm innovation. However, our findings hold 
only for U.S. firms. Thus, this specific organization of the board has real economic 
consequences in a country characterized by short-termism, but it has a merely 
symbolic value in European countries that have a long-term orientation (Hofstede et 
al., 2010).  
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We acknowledge that our study has some limitations. In particular, we posit that 
our difference-in-differences design with entropy balancing is well-suited for the 
identification of a causal relation between the presence of a R&D committee and R&D 
strategy. Nonetheless, we acknowledge that other studies employing other approaches 
are needed to confirm a causal relationship. Second, our results suggest that the 
presence of a R&D committee at the board-level influences R&D strategy. However, 
this committee advises the board and has no decision power. Thus, additional research 
is needed to better understand under which circumstances a committee influences R&D 
strategy. With all these caveats in mind, we nevertheless hope that our research is 
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Figure 1. Research and development process 
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Table 1. Sample distribution 
The groups of firms in Table 1 are determined as follows: (1) NEVER, 80 firms without a R&D committee during the full period; (2) ALWAYS, 33 firms with a R&D 
committee during the full period; and (3) CREATION, 44 firms that created a R&D committee between 2011 and 2018. LTO captures the long term orientation of 
the country, a key dimension of the national culture computed by Hofstede. (https://hi.hofstede-insights.com/national-culture). 
Country LTO 
NEVER ALWAYS CREATION 
Total  Total Total 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total 
Austria 60 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Belgium 82 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
France 63 2 4 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 4 10 
Germany 83 6 2 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 5 13 
Italy 61 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
Netherlands 67 2 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 4 
Switzerland 74 4 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 8 
United Kingdom 51 9 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 3 13 
Western Europe - 28 10 1 3 3 3 1 3 2 1 17 55 
United States 26 52 23 3 3 2 9 6 1 2 1 27 102 









Table 2. Description of R&D committees 
The sample is described in Table 1 and a detailed description of the variables can be found in Appendix 
B. The statistical significance in the two last columns represents the results of two univariate tests 
between U.S. and European firms: Student test for difference in means and Mann-Whitney test for 
difference in medians. 
 Full sample (N=511) U.S. firms (N=341) European firms (N=170) 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
RDC_Size 4.14 4 4.09 4 4.23 4* 
RDC_Board 0.46 0.43 0.47 0.43 0.45* 0.43** 
RDC_Independence 0.89 1 0.91 1 0.83*** 1 
RDC_Gender 0.18 0.17 0.14 0 0.28*** 0.25*** 
RDC_Age 61.81 62 62.89 63 59.66*** 59.80*** 





Table 3. Descriptive statistics  
The sample includes 1,413 observations (balanced sample of 157 pharmaceutical firms over the years 
2010-2018), except for RD_Sales (N=945). Variable definitions are provided in Appendix B. The statistical 
significance represents the results of two univariate tests (Student test for difference in means and Mann-
Whitney test for difference in medians) between groups NEVER and ALWAYS in panel B, and between 
U.S. and Europe in panel C.  
 
Panel A. Full sample 
 Mean SD 25% Median 75% 
A1. Variables of interest      
RD_Expense (million USD) 639.5 1,803 11.35 36.23 119.6 
RD_TA 0.23 0.25 0.06 0.15 0.34 
RD_Sales 0.25 0.25 0.07 0.16 0.34 
Products 11.84 37.59 0 0 3 
FDA 1.05 3.26 0 0 0 
M&A 0.43 0.74 0 0 1 
A2. Control variables      
CSO 55%     
Family_Firm 33%     
CEO_Change 10%     
CEO_Age 55.15 7.34 50 55 60 
BoD_Independence 0.82 0.12 0.75 0.86 0.89 
BoD_Gender 0.14 0.12 0 0.13 0.22 
Market_Value (million USD) 14,236 41,348 118.8 512.4 2,673 
M_B 1.93 96.91 1.86 3.21 6.10 
Leverage 0.52 0.96 0.22 0.42 0.62 
ROA  -0.20 0.60 -0.39 -0.08 0.08 
PPE_TA 0.11 0.12 0.02 0.06 0.15 
Listed_Years 18.90 10.63 11 17 24 
 
Panel B. Comparison of the three groups of firms 
 
CREATION (N=396) NEVER (N=720) ALWAYS (N=297)  
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
B1. Variables of interest       
RD_Expense (million USD) 519.8 46.58 304.1 20.32 1,612*** 120.2*** 
RD_TA 0.30 0.25 0.21 0.12 0.19 0.12 
RD_Sales 0.30 0.16 0.25 0.14 0.23** 0.18** 
Products 12.37 0 4.62 0 28.66*** 3*** 
FDA 1.53 0 0.31 0 2.20*** 0 




B2. Control variables       
CSO 64%  39%  81%***  
Family_Firm 27%  43%  18%***  
CEO_Change 11%  9%  12%  
CEO_Age 54.73 55 54.70 54 56.80*** 57 
BoD_Independence 0.83 0.86 0.79 0.82 0.87*** 0.89*** 
BoD_Gender 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.19*** 0.20*** 
Market_Value (million USD) 11,026 365.0 7,030 349.5 35,983*** 2,250*** 
M_B -1.23 3.05 2.74 3.30 4.17*** 3.21 
Leverage 0.56 0.40 0.53 0.42 0.43 0.43 
ROA -0.37 -0.25 -0.18 -0.09 -0.05*** 0.06*** 
PPE_TA 0.08 0.04 0.12 0.06 0.13 0.12*** 
Listed_Years 17.23 14 18.36 17 22.42*** 20*** 
       
       
Panel C. Comparison of U.S. and European firms 
 U.S. firms (N=918) European firms (N=495) 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
C1. Variables of interest     
RD_Expense (million USD) 544.1 38.68 816.2** 31.96 
RD_TA 0.29 0.22 0.14*** 0.07*** 
RD_Sales 0.32 0.21 0.165*** 0.10*** 
Products 9.10 0 16.93** 0 
FDA 0.62 0 1.83** 0 
M&A 0.50 0 0.39*** 0 
C2. Control variables     
CSO 57%  50%***  
Family_Firm 37%  26%***  
CEO_Change 11%  10%  
CEO_Age 56.10 56 53.39*** 53 
BoD_Independence 0.83 0.86 0.78*** 0.80*** 
BoD_Gender 0.12 0.13 0.17*** 0.18*** 
Market_Value (million USD) 12,930 393.5 16,657 834.5*** 
M_B 3.32 3.82 -0.65 2.62*** 
Leverage 0.55 0.41 0.47 0.42 
ROA  -0.26 -0.18 -0.09*** 0.05*** 
PPE_TA 0.10 0.05 0.14*** 0.10*** 






Table 4. The association between the existence of a R&D committee and R&D intensity 
The sample includes 1,413 observations (balanced sample of 157 pharmaceutical firms over the years 2010-2018), except for RD_Sales (N=945). A detailed 
description of the variables can be found in Appendix B. T-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm-level are presented in parentheses. ***, 
** and * denote 99%, 95% and 90% levels of confidence. 
  Full sample U.S. firms European firms 
 RD_Log RD_TA RD_Sales RD_Log RD_TA RD_Sales RD_Log RD_TA RD_Sales 
Constant -2.189*** 0.431*** 0.165 -0.712 0.809*** 0.459*** -4.540 -0.659* -1.827*** 
  (0.422) (0.085) (0.106) (0.551) (0.132) (0.177) (2.769) (0.366) (0.620) 
RDC_EXISTENCE 0.408*** 0.067*** 0.071*** 0.529*** 0.091*** 0.092*** -0.000 0.006 0.004 
  (0.061) (0.013) (0.018) (0.069) (0.017) (0.030) (0.007) (0.011) (0.024) 
CSO 0.527*** 0.076*** 0.125*** 0.342*** 0.080*** 0.126*** 0.709*** 0.052*** 0.122*** 
  (0.058) (0.011) (0.016) (0.074) (0.016) (0.024) (0.099) (0.011) (0.022) 
Family_Firm -0.136** 0.013 -0.048** -0.145** 0.030** -0.039 -0.036 -0.005 -0.033 
  (0.061) (0.012) (0.020) (0.072) (0.015) (0.027) (0.127) (0.013) (0.021) 
CEO_Change 0.137 -0.025 -0.021 0.170 -0.024 -0.015 0.122 -0.014 -0.024 
  (0.088) (0.018) (0.023) (0.113) (0.025) (0.034) (0.121) (0.015) (0.024) 
CEO_Age 0.008** -0.001 -0.001 0.007 -0.001 -0.001 0.023*** 0.000 0.001 
  (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.002) 
BoD_Independence 0.935*** -0.090 0.128 0.822* -0.152* 0.205 0.472 -0.099 0.082 
  (0.306) (0.060) (0.083) (0.429) (0.091) (0.136) (0.437) (0.065) (0.122) 
BoD_Gender -0.748*** 0.090* -0.091 -0.315 0.113 -0.185* -1.013** 0.048 -0.024 
  (0.280) (0.047) (0.070) (0.373) (0.072) (0.102) (0.470) (0.048) (0.096) 
Market_Value 0.778*** -0.025*** -0.010* 0.750*** -0.029*** -0.007 0.841*** -0.002 -0.017** 
  (0.026) (0.007) (0.005) (0.029) (0.007) (0.006) (0.042) (0.004) (0.008) 
M_B -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* 0.000 -0.000 0.000** -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage 0.234*** 0.078*** 0.041 0.233** 0.073*** 0.040 0.134 0.066*** 0.086 
  (0.091) (0.011) (0.026) (0.097) (0.009) (0.026) (0.252) (0.023) (0.068) 
ROA -0.394* -0.140** -0.148** -0.317 -0.108* -0.138** -0.947** -0.394*** -0.352*** 
  (0.223) (0.060) (0.067) (0.228) (0.055) (0.067) (0.413) (0.044) (0.100) 
PPE_TA -0.098 -0.150*** -0.284*** -0.121 -0.210*** -0.190** -0.149 0.004 -0.409*** 
  (0.305) (0.043) (0.064) (0.398) (0.056) (0.085) (0.450) (0.046) (0.095) 
Listed_Years 0.011*** -0.002*** -0.006*** -0.002 -0.002*** -0.008*** 0.030*** -0.001 -0.002**  
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) 
Country and Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,413 1,413 945 918 918 522 495 495 423 
Adj. R2 0.824 0.484 0.351 0.811 0.426 0.285 0.862 0.702 0.361 
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Table 5. The impact of R&D committee existence on other measures of R&D strategy 
The sample includes 1,413 observations (balanced sample of 157 pharmaceutical firms over the years 2010-2018). A detailed description of the variables can be 
found in Appendix B. T-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm-level are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote 99%, 95% and 90% 
levels of confidence. 
  Full sample U.S. firms  European firms 
 Products FDA M&A Products FDA M&A Products FDA M&A 
Constant -4.434*** -0.686*** -0.556** -4.885*** -0.631*** -0.762*** -4.855*** -0.919*** -0.227  
(0.296) (0.089) (0.238) (0.376) (0.094) (0.267) (0.506) (0.201) (0.457) 
RDC_EXISTENCE 0.275*** 0.076*** 0.116*** 0.398*** 0.081*** 0.141*** 0.029 0.059 0.077  
(0.057) (0.019) (0.045) (0.066) (0.019) (0.049) (0.096) (0.039) (0.090) 
CSO 0.319*** 0.023 0.025 0.141** 0.012 0.023 0.603*** 0.008 -0.044  
(0.047) (0.014) (0.037) (0.055) (0.014) (0.042) (0.082) (0.030) (0.074) 
Family_Firm 0.054 -0.007 0.032 0.179*** -0.006 0.009 -0.124 -0.002 0.105  
(0.048) (0.012) (0.037) (0.058) (0.012) (0.041) (0.102) (0.032) (0.075) 
CEO_Change 0.084 -0.013 0.026 0.062 -0.001 0.126* 0.173 -0.034 -0.205*  
(0.075) (0.025) (0.060) (0.093) (0.026) (0.070) (0.106) (0.049) (0.110) 
CEO_Age 0.006* -0.001 0.001 0.007** 0.000 0.010*** 0.004 -0.002 -0.018**  
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007) 
BoD_Independence 0.405* 0.225*** -0.146 0.125 0.122 -0.086 0.527 0.284** -0.112  
(0.226) (0.066) (0.176) (0.317) (0.080) (0.224) (0.339) (0.115) (0.261) 
BoD_Gender -0.393* -0.042 -0.243 -0.319 0.012 0.151 0.045 -0.011 -0.677*  
(0.208) (0.074) (0.179) (0.256) (0.083) (0.195) (0.372) (0.141) (0.366) 
Market_Value 0.363*** 0.045*** 0.089*** 0.358*** 0.036*** 0.053*** 0.403*** 0.073*** 0.162***  
(0.017) (0.005) (0.011) (0.019) (0.005) (0.012) (0.036) (0.013) (0.030) 
M_B -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage 0.128*** 0.015*** 0.013 0.119*** 0.014*** 0.009 0.121 -0.047 0.014  
(0.042) (0.005) (0.011) (0.040) (0.005) (0.010) (0.169) (0.030) (0.064) 
ROA -0.243** -0.035*** -0.073*** -0.174** -0.018** -0.062*** -0.721** -0.160** -0.104  
(0.099) (0.013) (0.020) (0.083) (0.009) (0.019) (0.341) (0.075) (0.087) 
PPE_TA -1.174*** -0.124** -0.734*** -0.353* -0.069 -0.535*** -2.368*** -0.207* -1.123***  
(0.200) (0.053) (0.127) (0.213) (0.051) (0.144) (0.348) (0.105) (0.224) 
Listed_Years 0.033*** 0.008*** 0.004** 0.025*** 0.005*** -0.001 0.039*** 0.011*** 0.007  
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) 
Country and Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,413 1,413 1,413 918 918 918 495 495 495 
Adj. R2 0.651 0.319 0.179 0.617 0.242 0.084 0.744 0.396 0.309 
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Table 6. The impact of R&D committee creation on R&D intensity 
The sample includes 1,116 observations (balanced sample of 157 pharmaceutical firms over the years 2010-2018), except for RD_Sales (N=675). A detailed 
description of the variables can be found in Appendix B. T-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm-level are presented in parentheses. ***, 
** and * denote 99%, 95% and 90% levels of confidence. 
  Full sample U.S. firms European firms 
 RD_Log RD_TA RD_Sales RD_Log RD_TA RD_Sales RD_Log RD_TA RD_Sales 
Constant -1.971*** 0.435*** -0.183 -0.472 0.797*** 0.183 -3.103** 0.016 -0.077 
  (0.481) (0.098) (0.129) (0.615) (0.146) (0.193) (1.444) (0.104) (0.200) 
RDC_CREATION 0.339*** 0.024 -0.067** 0.245** 0.019 -0.150*** 0.124 -0.002 -0.036 
  (0.098) (0.022) (0.028) (0.124) (0.031) (0.051) (0.332) (0.037) (0.046) 
RDC_CREATION*POST 0.319*** 0.069*** 0.073*** 0.311*** 0.078*** 0.130*** 0.021 0.009 -0.057 
  (0.094) (0.021) (0.028) (0.108) (0.026) (0.050) (0.242) (0.030) (0.044) 
CSO 0.528*** 0.077*** 0.164*** 0.343*** 0.082*** 0.198*** 0.727*** 0.055** 0.138*** 
  (0.074) (0.014) (0.019) (0.100) (0.021) (0.030) (0.204) (0.026) (0.038) 
Family_Firm -0.161** -0.000 -0.082*** -0.179** 0.015 -0.079** 0.113 0.004 -0.021 
  (0.069) (0.013) (0.022) (0.083) (0.017) (0.031) (0.283) (0.030) (0.046) 
CEO_Change 0.082 -0.027 -0.007 0.116 -0.026 0.020 0.013 -0.020 -0.032 
  (0.112) (0.023) (0.030) (0.150) (0.033) (0.049) (0.133) (0.022) (0.027) 
CEO_Age 0.005 -0.002* 0.001 0.006 -0.002* -0.000 0.017 0.000 0.000 
  (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.013) (0.002) (0.003) 
BoD_Independence 0.775** -0.084 0.329*** 0.857* -0.104 0.286* 0.496 -0.085 0.354** 
  (0.345) (0.068) (0.102) (0.471) (0.103) (0.159) (0.829) (0.098) (0.173) 
BoD_Gender -0.967*** 0.051 -0.262*** -0.434 0.067 -0.440*** -1.411 0.067 -0.183 
  (0.328) (0.054) (0.075) (0.462) (0.088) (0.110) (0.945) (0.072) (0.128) 
Market_Value 0.786*** -0.024*** -0.000 0.739*** -0.028*** 0.011 0.822*** 0.001 -0.027* 
  (0.030) (0.007) (0.006) (0.034) (0.007) (0.007) (0.086) (0.009) (0.015) 
M_B -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage 0.232** 0.078*** 0.037 0.231** 0.074*** 0.032 0.002 0.059* 0.163** 
  (0.091) (0.010) (0.024) (0.098) (0.009) (0.023) (0.364) (0.034) (0.073) 
ROA -0.378 -0.126** -0.128** -0.293 -0.101* -0.113* -1.478*** -0.437*** -0.285** 
  (0.245) (0.062) (0.062) (0.238) (0.057) (0.061) (0.311) (0.059) (0.131) 
PPE_TA -0.154 -0.151*** -0.277*** -0.570 -0.279*** -0.257** 0.304 0.087 -0.306* 
  (0.390) (0.054) (0.077) (0.474) (0.069) (0.103) (1.566) (0.091) (0.166) 
Listed_Years 0.010** -0.002*** -0.006*** -0.007 -0.003*** -0.006*** 0.045*** -0.001 -0.001  
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.016) (0.002) (0.003) 
Country and Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,116 1,116 675 711 711 387 405 405 288 
Adj. R2 0.759 0.457 0.396 0.685 0.392 0.342 0.855 0.674 0.431 
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Table 7. The impact of R&D committee creation on other measures of R&D strategy 
The sample includes 1,116 observations (balanced sample of 157 pharmaceutical firms over the years 2010-2018). A detailed description of the variables can be 
found in Appendix B. T-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm-level are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote 99%, 95% and 
90% levels of confidence. 
  Full sample U.S. firms European firms 
 Products FDA M&A Products FDA M&A Products FDA M&A 
Constant -4.954*** -1.277*** -0.443** -5.743*** -0.666*** -0.204 -3.796*** -0.224*** 1.829 
  (0.372) (0.168) (0.138) (0.396) (0.203) (0.490) (0.399) (0.069) (1.556) 
RDC_CREATION 0.238*** 0.168*** 0.639*** 0.147 0.165*** 0.379*** 0.005 -0.012 0.092 
  (0.059) (0.038) (0.041) (0.130) (0.056) (0.120) (0.088) (0.012) (0.378) 
RDC_CREATION*POST 0.306*** 0.228*** 0.632*** 0.328** 0.156*** 0.392*** 0.056 0.013 0.247 
  (0.057) (0.041) (0.034) (0.138) (0.049) (0.123) (0.073) (0.020) (0.397) 
CSO 0.344*** 0.058** -0.045 0.762*** 0.002 -0.082 0.035 -0.010 0.672** 
  (0.025) (0.026) (0.030) (0.060) (0.034) (0.087) (0.062) (0.013) (0.259) 
Family_Firm 0.050 0.041* 0.108*** 0.106 0.016 0.035 0.116* 0.003 -0.037 
  (0.037) (0.024) (0.029) (0.100) (0.035) (0.101) (0.065) (0.012) (0.302) 
CEO_Change 0.018 0.002 0.055 0.024 -0.039 -0.135 -0.003 -0.024** 0.043 
  (0.081) (0.044) (0.046) (0.203) (0.055) (0.103) (0.101) (0.012) (0.221) 
CEO_Age -0.003 -0.004*** 0.001 -0.019** -0.004 -0.017** 0.008** 0.000 -0.020 
  (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.001) (0.013) 
BoD_Independence 0.591 0.246** -0.559*** 0.879** 0.209 -0.512 0.147 0.120* -1.609 
  (0.329) (0.112) (0.158) (0.301) (0.131) (0.317) (0.298) (0.067) (1.272) 
BoD_Gender -0.346 0.061 0.003 -0.388 -0.123 -0.402 -0.090 0.132* -1.404 
  (0.215) (0.135) (0.086) (0.525) (0.123) (0.305) (0.270) (0.073) (1.063) 
Market_Value 0.402*** 0.086*** 0.100*** 0.454*** 0.055*** 0.188*** 0.292*** 0.010** 0.174** 
  (0.022) (0.008) (0.015) (0.046) (0.014) (0.042) (0.024) (0.004) (0.085) 
M_B -0.000 -0.000 0.000** -0.000* -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage 0.128** 0.025** 0.007 -0.062 -0.073** -0.015 0.099*** 0.006** 0.065 
  (0.048) (0.011) (0.005) (0.215) (0.030) (0.064) (0.034) (0.002) (0.086) 
ROA -0.226 -0.027 -0.008 -1.409*** -0.176*** -0.073 -0.128* -0.005 -0.345 
  (0.137) (0.019) (0.019) (0.250) (0.049) (0.107) (0.071) (0.004) (0.228) 
PPE_TA -1.112*** 0.008 -0.294** -1.128** 0.111 -0.818*** -0.776*** -0.081** 0.113 
  (0.207) (0.103) (0.096) (0.414) (0.104) (0.254) (0.217) (0.038) (1.576) 
Listed_Years 0.043*** 0.016*** 0.004*** 0.085*** 0.013*** -0.004 0.008** -0.000 0.006  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.001) (0.019) 
Country and Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,116 1,116 1,116 711 711 711 405 405 405 
Adj. R2 0.584 0.470 0.348 0.794 0.424 0.364 0.373 0.042 0.051 
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Table 8. The impact of the creation of a R&D committee on R&D intensity with entropy balancing 
The sample includes 1,116 observations (balanced sample of 157 pharmaceutical firms over the years 2010-2018), except for RD_Sales (N=675). A detailed 
description of the variables can be found in Appendix B. T-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm-level are presented in parentheses. ***, 
** and * denote 99%, 95% and 90% levels of confidence. 
  Full sample U.S. firms European firms 
 RD_Log RD_TA RD_Sales RD_Log RD_TA RD_Sales RD_Log RD_TA RD_Sales 
Constant -0.513 0.575*** -0.195 0.943 0.944*** 0.027 -0.961 -0.112 0.328 
  (0.533) (0.133) (0.144) (0.586) (0.146) (0.184) (0.888) (0.124) (0.257) 
RDC_CREATION 0.268*** 0.018 -0.091*** 0.043 -0.004 -0.165*** -0.047 0.003 -0.029 
  (0.097) (0.023) (0.032) (0.109) (0.032) (0.057) (0.150) (0.024) (0.024) 
RDC_CREATION*POST 0.420*** 0.094*** 0.070** 0.386*** 0.109*** 0.103** -0.074 0.007 -0.031 
  (0.078) (0.020) (0.027) (0.086) (0.027) (0.051) (0.128) (0.023) (0.025) 
CSO 0.533*** 0.049*** 0.144*** 0.199** 0.038 0.164*** 0.801*** 0.037** 0.098*** 
  (0.071) (0.018) (0.021) (0.084) (0.026) (0.033) (0.123) (0.017) (0.026) 
Family_Firm -0.120 0.026 -0.087*** -0.141 0.046* -0.042 0.483*** 0.025 -0.081*** 
  (0.076) (0.022) (0.023) (0.092) (0.028) (0.033) (0.156) (0.020) (0.029) 
CEO_Change 0.154 -0.049 -0.016 0.163 -0.066 -0.008 -0.130 -0.032 -0.072*** 
  (0.108) (0.030) (0.031) (0.144) (0.042) (0.046) (0.123) (0.024) (0.025) 
CEO_Age 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.015*** 0.001 0.002 -0.009 -0.001 -0.006*** 
  (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.008) (0.001) (0.002) 
BoD_Independence -0.131 -0.136 0.321** -0.155 -0.220* 0.260 -0.370 -0.090 0.300 
  (0.432) (0.115) (0.142) (0.550) (0.120) (0.181) (0.589) (0.137) (0.189) 
BoD_Gender -0.684* 0.125 -0.368*** -0.302 0.177 -0.548*** -1.031* 0.220** -0.149 
  (0.372) (0.086) (0.093) (0.431) (0.124) (0.143) (0.601) (0.103) (0.127) 
Market_Value 0.735*** -0.036*** 0.005 0.670*** -0.043*** 0.019** 0.872*** 0.020*** -0.018 
  (0.022) (0.007) (0.007) (0.024) (0.008) (0.008) (0.039) (0.007) (0.011) 
M_B -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage 0.234*** 0.079*** -0.021 0.307*** 0.076*** -0.033 -0.387*** 0.016 0.087 
  (0.090) (0.019) (0.044) (0.095) (0.014) (0.048) (0.075) (0.021) (0.069) 
ROA 0.115 -0.019 -0.203*** 0.151** -0.014 -0.207*** -1.579*** -0.531*** -0.306** 
  (0.089) (0.040) (0.060) (0.065) (0.032) (0.066) (0.159) (0.062) (0.118) 
PPE_TA -0.413 -0.161*** -0.356*** -0.367 -0.166** -0.247* -1.129 0.099 -0.338*** 
  (0.375) (0.056) (0.095) (0.364) (0.075) (0.131) (0.780) (0.085) (0.110) 
Listed_Years 0.018*** -0.001 -0.006*** -0.008* -0.002** -0.007*** 0.048*** -0.002* -0.002  
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.008) (0.001) (0.002) 
Country and Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,116 1,116 675 711 711 387 405 405 288 
Adj. R2 0.838 0.415 0.527 0.771 0.312 0.404 0.934 0.858 0.588 
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Table 9. The impact of the creation of a R&D committee on other measures of R&D strategy with entropy balancing 
The sample includes 1,116 observations (balanced sample of 157 pharmaceutical firms over the years 2010-2018). A detailed description of the variables can be 
found in Appendix B. T-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm-level are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote 99%, 95% and 
90% levels of confidence.  
Full sample U.S. firms European firms 
 Products FDA M&A Products FDA M&A Products FDA M&A 
Constant -4.525*** -1.455*** 0.183 -4.951*** -1.716*** -1.211*** -5.283*** -1.102*** 0.999 
  (0.462) (0.255) (0.425) (0.623) (0.457) (0.430) (0.638) (0.256) (0.703) 
RDC_CREATION 0.153 0.412*** 0.557*** -0.058 0.548*** 0.812*** 0.078 0.044 0.282 
  (0.107) (0.068) (0.088) (0.141) (0.110) (0.078) (0.128) (0.038) (0.200) 
RDC_CREATION*POST 0.286*** 0.346*** 0.583*** 0.288*** 0.626*** 0.745*** 0.022 -0.011 0.311* 
  (0.076) (0.046) (0.062) (0.094) (0.094) (0.051) (0.140) (0.040) (0.176) 
CSO 0.426*** 0.139*** -0.036 0.056 0.166** -0.027 0.816*** -0.029 -0.130 
  (0.070) (0.041) (0.070) (0.089) (0.072) (0.065) (0.100) (0.039) (0.139) 
Family_Firm 0.416*** 0.070* 0.043 0.506*** 0.150 0.135* 0.250** 0.072 -0.025 
  (0.080) (0.040) (0.071) (0.107) (0.092) (0.073) (0.112) (0.047) (0.183) 
CEO_Change -0.035 -0.015 0.033 -0.064 -0.017 0.198*** -0.065 0.027 -0.281* 
  (0.105) (0.060) (0.079) (0.146) (0.106) (0.072) (0.109) (0.051) (0.154) 
CEO_Age -0.001 -0.012*** -0.006 0.010* -0.017*** 0.010*** -0.012 0.004* -0.039*** 
  (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.008) (0.002) (0.012) 
BoD_Independence 0.500 0.401** -0.817*** 0.012 0.183 -0.105 0.350 0.209 -0.648 
  (0.402) (0.191) (0.295) (0.534) (0.340) (0.224) (0.529) (0.209) (0.459) 
BoD_Gender 0.270 0.451 -0.192 0.503 -1.191*** 0.419** 0.949** 0.706*** -0.797* 
  (0.276) (0.328) (0.212) (0.341) (0.286) (0.195) (0.387) (0.185) (0.453) 
Market_Value 0.382*** 0.089*** 0.096*** 0.349*** 0.125*** 0.055*** 0.508*** 0.049*** 0.196*** 
  (0.022) (0.010) (0.017) (0.028) (0.028) (0.016) (0.033) (0.012) (0.056) 
M_B -0.000** 0.000 0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage 0.167* 0.106** -0.008 0.191* -0.153 0.031 0.102 0.114*** -0.031 
  (0.096) (0.043) (0.023) (0.116) (0.099) (0.030) (0.132) (0.041) (0.096) 
ROA -0.043 0.014 -0.024* -0.010 -0.507*** -0.007 -1.287*** 0.015 0.045 
  (0.056) (0.014) (0.014) (0.034) (0.137) (0.017) (0.228) (0.012) (0.180) 
PPE_TA -1.731*** -0.197 -0.330 -1.657*** 0.597* -0.257 -1.521*** -0.679*** -1.110*** 
  (0.276) (0.167) (0.217) (0.334) (0.328) (0.218) (0.447) (0.155) (0.413) 
Listed_Years 0.043*** 0.022*** 0.008*** 0.029*** 0.040*** 0.011*** 0.034*** -0.002 -0.004  
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007) (0.002) (0.011) 
Country and Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,116 1,116 1,116 711 711 711 405 405 405 




Appendix A. Articles about the effect of Corporate Governance on R&D 
Panel A. List of articles 
Panel A1. Single country studies 
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Study. Journal of Product Innovation and Management, 36(4), 490-512. 
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Journal of Financial Economics, 130, 237-264. 
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12 Bravo, F., and Reguera-Alvarado, N. (2017). The effect of board of directors on R&D intensity: board 
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13 Helmers, C., Patnam, M., Rau, R. (2017). Do board interlocks increase innovation? Evidence from a 
corporate governance reform in India. Journal of Banking and Finance, 80, 51-70. 
14 Jia, N. (2017). Should Directors Have Term Limits? – Evidence from Corporate Innovation. European 
Accounting Review, 26(4), 755-785. 
15 Medcof, J.W., and Lee, T. (2017). The effects of the chief technology officer and firm and industry R&D 
intensity on organizational performance. R&D Management, 47(5), 767-781. 
16 Chen, S., Ni, X., Tong, J.Y. (2016). Gender Diversity in the Boardroom and Risk Management: A Case of 
R&D Investment. Journal of Business Ethics, 136, 599-621. 
17 Guldiken, O., and Darendeli, I.S. (2016). Too much of a good thing: Board monitoring and R&D investments. 
Journal of Business Research, 69, 2931-2938. 
18 Midavaine, J., Dolfsma, W., Aalbers, R. (2016). Board diversity and R&D Investment, Management Decision, 
54(3), 558-569. 
19 Zona, F. (2016). Agency models in different stages of CEO tenure: The effects of stock options and board 
independence on R&D investment. Research Policy, 45, 560-575. 
20 Lim, E.N.K. (2015). The role of reference point in CEO restricted stock and its impact on R&D intensity in 
high-technology firms. Strategic Management Journal, 36, 872-889. 
21 Anderson, R.C., Duru, A., Reeb, D.M. (2012). Investment policy in family controlled firms. Journal of 
Banking & Finance, 36, 1744-1758. 
22 Block, J.H. (2012). R&D investments in family and founder firms: An agency perspective. Journal of 
Business Venturing,27, 248-265. 
23 Dalziel, T., Gentry, R.J., Bowerman, M. (2011). An Integrated Agency–Resource Dependence View of the 
Influence of Directors’ Human and Relational Capital on Firms’ R&D Spending. Journal of Management 
Studies, 48(6), 1217-1242. 
24 Osma, C.G. (2008). Board Independence and Real Earnings Management: The Case of R&D Expenditure. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 16(2), 116-131. 
25 Deutsch, Y. (2007). The Influence of Outside Directors’ Stock-Option Compensation on Firms’ R&D. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15(5), 816-827. 
Panel A2. Cross-country studies 
26 Zavertiaeva, M.A., Lopez-Iturriaga, F.J., Kuminova, E.V. (2018). Better innovators or more innovators? 
Managerial overconfidence and corporate R&D. Managerial and Decision Economics, 39, 447-461. 
27 Honore, F., Munari, F., Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, B.V. (2015). Corporate governance practices and 
companies’ R&D intensity: Evidence from European countries. Research Policy, 44, 533-543. 
28 Shao, L., Kwok, C.C.Y., Zhang, R. (2013) National culture and corporate investment. Journal of International 
Business Studies, 44, 745-763. 
29 Hillier, D., Pindado, J., Queiroz, V., Torre, C. (2011). The impact of country-level corporate governance on 
research and development. Journal of International Business Studies, 42(1), 76-98. 
30 Munari, F., Oriani, R., Sobrero, M. (2010). The effects of owner identity and external governance systems 
on R&D investments: A study on Western European firms. Research Policy, 39, 1093-1104. 
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Panel B. Categorization of the literature 
Variables Articles 













Other R&D measure 1;4;6;8;24 




Board size 5;16 
Board independence 5;11;16;24 
Gender diversity 3;6;16;18 
Age diversity 5;6;12;14;18;23;26 
Tenure diversity 5;6;8;18;23 
Industrial/Experience diversity 1;5;6;18;23 
Education 18;23 
Busy 5;13 
Outside directors 7;9;10;23;25 
Executive management 
 
CEO compensation 19 
CEO directorship 8;21 
CEO tenure 8;14;19; 
CEO duality 10;12;14;16;19;20 
CEO outside 4;8;21 
CEO ownership 14;21 
CEO overconfidence 26 
CEO experience 26 




Director compensation 17;25 
Director ownership 5;14 
Ownership structure 21;22;30 
Investor protection 29 
Corporate governance index 29 
Other measures 2;27;28 
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Appendix B. Variable definitions 
  
Variable Definition 
PANEL A. Dependent variables 
RD_Log Natural logarithm of R&D expenses. 
RD_TA R&D expenses to total assets. 
RD_Sales R&D expenses to sales. 
Products Number of products in clinical trial development. 
FDA Number of products approved by the regulator. 
M&A Number of acquisitions made. 
PANEL B. Independent variables of interest 
RDC_EXISTENCE Dummy variable equal to 1 if the company has a R&D committee in year t, 
and 0 otherwise. 
RDC_CREATION Dummy variable equal to 1 if the company created a R&D committee during 
the period of interest, and 0 otherwise. 
POST Dummy variable equal to 1 for the year of R&D committee creation and 
subsequent years, and 0 for previous years. 
RDC_Size Number of directors on the R&D committee. 
RDC_Board The ratio of number of directors on the R&D committee to number of directors 
on the board of directors. 
RDC_Independence Number of independent directors to total number of directors in the R&D 
committee. 
RDC_Gender Number of female directors to total number of directors in the R&D 
committee. 
RDC_Age Average age of directors in the R&D committee. 
RDC_Science Directors with scientific background (i.e., the director has a diploma in a 
scientific field related to the pharmaceutical industry) to total number of 
directors in the R&D committee. 
PANEL C. Control variables 
CSO Dummy variable equal to 1 if the company has a Chief Scientific or a R&D 
officer in the Top Management Team, and 0 otherwise. 
Family_Firm Dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is classified as a family firm, and 
0 otherwise. 
CEO_Change Dummy variable equal to 1 if the company changed its CEO during the year, 
and 0 otherwise. 
CEO_Age Current age of the CEO. 
BoD_Independence Number of independent directors in BoD to total number of directors in BoD. 
BoD_Gender Number of female directors in BoD to total number of directors in BoD.  
Market_Value Natural logarithm of firm’s market capitalization. 
M_B Market-to-book ratio, measured as the ratio of market capitalization to total 
common equity. 
Leverage Total debt to total assets. 
ROA Operating income to total assets. 
PPE_TA The ratio of net property, plant and equipment to total assets. 
Listed_Years The number of years since the company IPO. 
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Appendix C. Examples of R&D committees’ objectives 
Company Reasons 
4SC Advise and monitor R&D. 
Acorda Therapeutics Oversees development opportunities regarding new or development 
products. 
Advaxis Provide advice on product scientific and development matters. 
Allergan Assist the Board with requirements related to product safety and 
quality, environmental, health and safety issues. 
Alnylam Review scientific and R&D strategy, R&D programs, scientific 
research, discoveries and commercial developments. 
Array Biopharma Oversee company's clinical development activities and decisions, 
and review company clinical development programs. 
Assembly Biosciences Oversee R&D activities and advise on strategic and tactical matters. 
Bayer Focus on innovation strategy and management of R&D projects. 
Biofrontera Deal with key issues related to product development. 
Biomarin Monitor strategy, direction, and effectiveness of R&D organization, 
including the review of matter related to scientific technology. 
Caladrius Biosciences Review the science, clinical and regulatory strategy and underlying 
company R&D strategy. 
Catalyst Assess R&D activities, initiatives, strategies and reporting emerging 
issues. 
Curis Evaluate the quality and direction of R&D programs and review R&D 
pipeline. 
GlaxoSmithKline Look at science, pipeline and R&D capital allocation. 
Newron 
Pharmaceuticals 
Review and evaluate internal R&D projects, R&D strategies and 
report scientific trends to the Board. 
Novartis Oversee R&D strategy, and evaluate the effectiveness and 
competitiveness of R&D organization. 
Novo Nordisk Assist the Board with oversight of R&D strategy, the pipeline and 
other related tasks. 
Qiagen Review and monitor R&D projects, programs, budgets and risk 
related to company's portfolio. 
Valneva Provide opinions regarding projects in research or under 
development, and assistance for evaluating and overseeing 
company's R&D strategy. 







Chapter 2: Do large pharmaceutical firms benefit 
from R&D alliances with small firms? 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Strategic alliances can take many forms, ranging from simple agreements with no 
equity ties to formal arrangements involving equity ownership and shared managerial 
control over joint activities. They have been frequent in the pharmaceutical industry 
over the last decades, which is not surprising as the drug development process is risky 
(i.e., the probability of not finding a new drug is high), takes a lot of time (i.e., the 
average duration is about 10 years), and is very expensive (DiMasi et al.,1991; 
Hagedoorn, 1993; Xu, 2006; Petrova, 2014). In such a context, alliances are motivated 
by firms’ willingness to share the costs and risks associated with the development of 
new drugs, as well as by the access to specific knowledge (Hagedoorn, 1993; Chan et 
al., 1997; Das et al., 1998; Anand and Khanna, 2003; Xu et al., 2006; Higgins, 2007; 
Contractor and Reuer, 2014; Heil and Bornemann, 2018). 
In this industry, alliances often involve a large and a small firm. Small firms 
usually lack financial resources, especially if they are not listed on the stock market, 
as well as experience to develop new drugs (Cullen and Dibner, 1993; Gomes-
Casseres, 1997; Audretsch and Feldman, 2003), while large firms are motivated by the 
access to specific knowledge (Das et al., 1998). Prior research, however, has 
mentioned a “swimming with sharks” dilemma (Katila et al., 2008; Diestre et al., 2013), 
also known as the “hold-up” problem (Holmström and Roberts, 1998), which means 
that small firms expect some benefits from the alliance, but they must also face an 
expropriation risk as large pharmaceutical firms may try to extract private benefits.  
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Our paper contributes to this scant stream of research by investigating whether 
the existence of a R&D alliance impacts the market reaction to clinical trial 
announcements by large pharmaceutical firms, and whether that market reaction 
differs for alliances with large and with small firms. If large firms are able to extract 
private benefits in alliances with small firms (i.e., materialization of the “hold-up”), 
then a more positive market reaction is expected for new announcements about the 
development of new drugs. However, two key arguments suggest that this 
expropriation risk may be low or non-existent. First, (rational) small firms aware of 
such risk should use their bargaining power, which comes from the detention of 
specific knowledge or technological know-how (Das et al., 1998), to protect 
themselves with effective contractual arrangements (Higgins et al., 2007). Second, 
large firms should avoid the extraction of private benefits to protect their reputation 
in order to attract other small firms detaining specific knowledge in the future. Thus, 
the market reaction may not be very large for announcements made by large 
pharmaceutical firms involved in an alliance with a small firm as the latter may capture 
a large part of the benefits generated by the alliance (Das et al., 1998). 
 Our empirical examination is based on a sample of 544 hand-collected 
announcements of clinical trials by twelve large pharmaceutical firms over the period 
2011-2017. We split this sample into good news (successes) and bad news (failures) 
at the various stages of drug development (clinical trials in Phase I, II, and III). 
Moreover, we distinguish announcements based on the existence of an alliance or not, 
and on the presence of a small or a large partner in the case of an alliance. We capture 
the market reaction with cumulative abnormal returns and abnormal trading volumes 
as these measures are not correlated. Indeed, Bamber et al. (2011) suggest that firms’ 
46 
 
announcements may not change market expectations as a whole (i.e., no abnormal 
return), even if investors revise their expectations (i.e., significant trading), which may 
ultimately reflect an absence of market consensus.   
Our main empirical results are as follows. First, in line with our expectations, 
we find a positive market reaction to announcements of successes in clinical trials, and 
a negative reaction for failures. However, a significant (positive or negative) reaction 
is only detected for later stages of drug development (i.e., Phase III). This result 
suggests that announcements of drug development in the earliest stage (Phase I) are 
not relevant for investors because uncertainty is still too great regarding future 
outcomes. Second, the market reaction is sensitive to the existence of an alliance. The 
market value (i.e., cumulative abnormal returns over a 3-day window) increases more 
in the case of success in Phase III, and decreases more in the case of failure in Phase 
III, when a large pharmaceutical firm develops the new drug alone. This finding is 
expected as all costs, benefits and risks are then borne by the large pharmaceutical 
firm.  Third, a difference exists for alliances with large firms and with small firms. The 
market reaction is systematically negative for alliances with small firms, suggesting 
that large pharmaceutical firms do not extract private benefits in R&D alliances with 
small firms.  
Overall, our findings suggest that R&D alliances with small firms have no 
favorable impact on the value of large pharmaceutical firms announcing the results of 
clinical trials. This result supports the idea that the expropriation risk is not that 
important, possibly because large firms care about their reputation (i.e., they want to 
attract other innovative firms in the future), or because small firms use their bargaining 
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power to protect themselves through effective contractual arrangements (Higgins et 
al., 2007). 
Our study therefore contributes to the literature on market reactions to 
announcements of alliances, which usually shows a positive reaction and suggests that 
investors expect various benefits from an alliance, in terms of cost reduction, risk 
sharing, revenue growth or access to knowledge (Hagedoorn, 1993; Chan et al., 1997; 
Das et al., 1998; Anand and Khanna, 2003; Xu et al., 2006; Higgins, 2007; Contractor 
and Reuer, 2014; Heil and Bornemann, 2018). However, the existing studies usually 
focus on the initial market expectations, which are formed in a context of high 
uncertainty regarding the outcomes of the alliance, and do not consider subsequent 
revisions of expectations by investors when uncertainty decreases. Our study shows 
that the market reaction becomes significant at the very end of the R&D process, when 
uncertainty about future payoffs is reduced. Moreover, investor reaction for large firms 
is greater when the alliance involves another large firm, when compared to alliances 
with small firms, suggesting that small firms do not “swim with sharks” (Katila et al., 
2008; Diestre et al., 2013). We also add to the literature on market reaction during the 
various stages of R&D in the pharmaceutical industry (Ely et al., 2003; Girotra et al., 
2007; Dedman et al., 2008), which has not yet investigated whether the results are 
sensitive to the existence of an alliance. Our paper is the first to show that the market 
reaction to clinical trial announcements depends on the existence of an alliance.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is dedicated to the 
literature review and to the development of our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the 




2.2. Prior literature and hypotheses 
2.2.1. Market reaction to clinical trial disclosure 
The R&D process is highly standardized in the pharmaceutical industry (DiMasi et al., 
1991; Petrova, 2014). As shown in Figure 1, drug development starts with a phase of 
pre-development including animal testing followed by a phase of development, which 
consists of three clinical trials on humans. During the final phase of clinical trials 
(Phase III), the new drug is tested on a large number of patients. Finally, after approval 
from the regulator, the R&D process ends with a post-development phase including 
post-market monitoring.  
[INSERT FIGURE 1] 
Since a new drug advances into the next phase only if it successfully passes the 
previous phase, uncertainty about future payoffs decreases as it moves through the 
different stages of clinical trials (Ely et al., 2003; Girotra, 2007). Thus, this specific 
environment creates a unique opportunity to better understand whether a decrease in 
uncertainty affects the market value of firms. Several papers have already shown that 
clinical trial announcements matter for investors (Ely et al., 2003; Qiao, 2006; Girotra 
et al., 2007; Dedman et al., 2008; Szutowski, 2018), but they do not investigate the 
impact of an alliance, especially between large firms and small firms. 
Ely et al. (2003) focus on the various stages of product development for 243 
biotechnology observations during the period 1988-1998 and find a significant and 
non-reverting market response for announcements of clinical trials in Phase II. They 
conclude that Phase II is the initial point at which investors have sufficient confidence 
that a new drug has reached a minimum potential for success, which leads to an 
increase in firm market value. Girotra et al. (2007) investigate 132 failures in Phase 
III, announced by pharmaceutical firms during the period 1994–2004. The market 
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reaction to such announcements is negative and economically important, amounting to 
$405 million. However, the impact of the failure is smaller when the firm is developing 
other projects for the same market as the failed project. For their sample of 151 non-
contaminated announcements in the UK during the period 1990-1998, Dedman et al. 
(2008) find that drug development announcements have a greater impact on the market 
value than earnings announcements. They also note that firms announce more good 
news than bad news, and more news on the latest stage than on the earliest stage. 
This pattern of disclosure, and the subsequent market reactions, varies between larger 
firms and their smaller counterparts. Finally, Szutowski (2018) investigates 407 
announcements by European biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms, for the period 
2001-2016. The market reaction is sensitive to the stage of development as the stock 
returns are higher when the level of advancement is low, but smaller when the 
production of a new drug starts. Overall, these papers show that investors revise their 
expectations when uncertainty decreases (i.e., the probability of launching a new drug 
increases).  
To the extent that investors are able to better predict future cash-flows when 
uncertainty is lower, we expect a more positive (negative) market reaction when a firm 
announces a success (failure) during the latest stage of drug development. Thus, we 
formulate our first hypothesis as follows: 
H1: The market reaction is larger for announcements of the latest stage of clinical 
trials (i.e., Phase III) by a large pharmaceutical firm than for the earliest stage of 
clinical trials (Phase I). 
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2.2.2. Market reaction to announcements of alliances 
Prior research has also focused on the market reaction to announcements of alliances. 
Investors often react positively when new alliances are announced (Chan et al., 1997; 
Das et al., 1998; Wu and Wei, 1998; Anand and Khanna, 2000; Qiao, 2006; Xu et al., 
2006; Higgins et al., 2007).  
Chan et al. (1997) study 345 alliances for the period 1983-1992 and find a 
positive market reaction for both partners, as well as for horizontal (i.e., alliances that 
involve partner firms in the same industry) and non-horizontal alliances. However, the 
market reaction is stronger when horizontal alliances involve the transfer and/or 
pooling of technical knowledge, in comparison to marketing alliances. Das et al. (1998) 
investigate 119 alliances during the period 1987-1991. They show a larger market 
reaction for technological alliances (i.e., activities such as R&D, engineering, and 
manufacturing, which often involve the production and sharing of knowledge) than for 
marketing alliances (i.e., activities such as sales, distribution, and customer service). 
Moreover, smaller partners appear to benefit the most from technological alliances, as 
larger firms capture less of the gain. Wu and Wei (1998) analyze 105 R&D alliances 
for the period 1985-1992 and show a positive market reaction, but intra-industry R&D 
cooperation leads to higher market reactions than inter-industry cooperation. Anand 
and Khanna (2000) investigate 870 joint ventures and 11,006 licensing agreements for 
the period 1990-1993, and find large learning effects in managing joint ventures but 
not for licensing contracts. However, the effects on market value are larger for 
research joint ventures, when compared to marketing joint ventures.  
Qiao (2006), Xu et al. (2006), and Higgins et al. (2007) also consider R&D 
alliances, but only in the pharmaceutical industry. Qiao (2006) examines 611 
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announcements made by 103 biotechnology firms for the period 1983-1993. The 
market reaction is positive, but the five types of news included in their sample, 
including announcements of strategic alliances or research joint ventures formed by 
biotech firms, yield the same results. Based on a sample of 690 R&D alliances for the 
period 1998-2004, Xu et al. (2006) show that the market reaction is sensitive to the 
type of the alliance (i.e., R&D, marketing, and manufacturing), as well as of the 
announcer's size. Small firms benefit more from such alliances than large firms. Higgins 
et al. (2007) investigate the stock market response to the announcement of 165 
alliances during the period 1993-2000, between research intensive biotechnology 
firms and large pharmaceutical firms. The market reaction is positive, but stronger 
when pharmaceutical firms enter into alliances where products are in earlier stages of 
development. The negative impact of an alliance during the later stages of development 
may signal a weakness in the research pipeline. 
Overall, the previous results support the idea that various benefits are expected 
by investors when an alliance is announced, especially in terms of revenue growth, 
cost reduction, risk sharing, and access to knowledge (Hagedoorn, 1993; Chan et al., 
1997; Das et al., 1998; Anand and Khanna, 2003; Contractor and Reuer, 2014; Heil and 
Bornemann, 2018). However, while instructive, previous studies only consider the 
market reaction at the announcement of new alliances, when the outcome of the 
alliances is highly uncertain. Since investors revise their expectations during the R&D 
process, it is possible that the previous findings change when uncertainty about future 
payoffs decreases. In fact, we expect a much lower market reaction when a large firm 
involved in an alliance announces the results of clinical trials in Phase III as it has to 
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share the future cash-flows generated by a new drug (in case of success) or the costs 
of the project (in case of failure). Thus, we formulate our second hypothesis as follows: 
H2: The market reaction is lower for announcements of the latest stages of clinical 
trials (i.e., Phase III) when a large pharmaceutical firm is involved in a R&D alliance. 
Finally, our last hypothesis concerns the size of the partner when a large 
pharmaceutical firm forms an alliance. It has been argued that large firms are eager to 
collaborate with small and innovative firms to access their specific knowledge (Das et 
al., 1998; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). Small firms are interested in alliances with 
large pharmaceutical firms because they lack financial resources and experience 
(Audtretsch and Feldman, 2004), which are essential to transform their specific 
knowledge into viable drugs (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004; Diestre and Rajagopalan, 
2012). However, small firms face the risk that large firms extract abnormal benefits 
from the alliance (Higgins, 2007; Katila et al., 2008; Diestre and Rajagopalan, 2012). 
This “hold-up” problem (Holmström and Roberts, 1998) means that alliances with small 
firms may be more beneficial for the large firms than alliances between two large firms. 
One may argue, however, that the risk of “swimming with sharks” is low for two 
main reasons. First, small firms can protect their own interests against the 
opportunistic behavior of large firms with some effective contractual arrangements 
(Higgins et al., 2007; Katila et al., 2008; Diestre and Rajagopalan, 2012). This is likely 
as small firms detain the specific knowledge, or the technological know-how, which 
gives them a significant bargaining power (Das et al., 1998). Second, large 
pharmaceutical firms care about their reputation (i.e., being a “good ally”) in order to 
attract innovative firms in the future. Therefore, they have no strong incentives to 
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extract abnormal benefits. Based on the previous arguments, we formulate the 
following hypothesis: 
H3: The market reaction is lower for announcements of the latest stage of clinical 
trials (Phase III) when a large firm is involved in a R&D alliance with a small partner 
than when another large firm is involved in the alliance. 
2.3. Research design 
2.3.1. Sample and data 
To test our hypotheses, we focus on clinical trial announcements made by the twelve 
largest pharmaceutical firms in terms of assets, revenue, and R&D investment. 
Appendix A provides the names of these firms, as well as key financial information 
extracted from ThomsonReuters for the year 2017. The clinical trials announcements 
for the period 2011-2017 were hand-collected from Lexis/Nexis and 
ThomsonReuters, and consist of successes and failures in Phase I, II, and III. We follow 
Das et al. (1998) and Dedman et al. (2008) by excluding contaminated announcements 
(e.g., several clinical trials, earnings or dividend announcements, etc.), which occurred 
within five calendar days before or after clinical trial announcements. Thus, we focus 
on the market reaction to non-contaminated news, which leads to a final sample of 544 
clinical trial announcements. Some examples of announcements are provided in 
Appendix B. 
Table 1 describes our sample. We observe more announcements for successful 
clinical trials than for failures, as well as more announcements for Phase III than for 
Phase I. This sample distribution supports the findings of Dedman et al. (2008): firms 
announce significantly more good news than bad news and more news regarding later 
stages of drug development. Finally, 128 announcements involve another firm, knowing 
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that alliances with small partners (101) are more prevalent than alliances with large 
partners (27). 
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
2.3.2. Models 
To capture the market reaction to clinical trials, we implement an event study. Such 
an approach allows us to capture the changes in investors’ expectations (or market 
reaction) when the clinical trials are announced. The main model writes as follows: 
CARi,t (or AVOLi,t) = β0 + β1Phase_IIi,t + β2Phase_IIIi,t + β3Alliancei,t 
+ β4Phase_II*Alliancei,t + β5Phase_III*Alliancei,t + CONTROLS + ɛi,t    
 (Eq. 1) 
To capture the market reaction to clinical trial announcements, we use two 
variables: CAR and AVOL. The cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) over three days is 
frequently used in the literature (Chan et al., 1997; Das et al., 1998; Qiao, 2006; Girotra 
et al., 2007; Dedman et al., 2008). The event window goes from one day before (t-1) 
to one day after (t+1) the announcement. To obtain CAR, we compute the expected 
returns with the market model, with an estimation period starting 120 days and ending 
10 days before the event date. Given that market reaction could be sensitive to the 
choice of the event window, we also use other windows in additional analyses. Table 
2 reports the descriptive statistics and shows a mean value of 0.35% for CAR. 
We also capture market reaction with the abnormal trading volume (AVOL), 
because it has been documented that abnormal returns and abnormal volumes are not 
perfectly correlated. Indeed, Bamber et al. (2011) suggest that firm announcements 
may not change market expectations as a whole (i.e., no abnormal return), even if 
investors revise their expectations (i.e., significant trading), which may ultimately 
reflect an absence of market consensus.  We follow Garfinkel and Sokobin (2006) and 
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compute AVOL as the difference between announcement period trading and market 
trading, and adjust our measure for the liquidity of the firm’s trading volume before the 










with VOLi,t being the firm volume on day t, and SHRSi,t is the firm outstanding 
shares. Table 2 shows a mean value of 1.65% for AVOL. 
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
Our main independent variables of interest are Phase_II, Phase_III, Alliance, and 
Small partner. These four variables are dummy variables, taking the value 1 if the 
announcement refers to Phase II or Phase III, or if two firms are involved in the drug 
development (Alliance), or if a large pharmaceutical firm is allied with a small firm 
(Small partner), and 0 otherwise. 
To support our first hypothesis (H1) regarding a greater market reaction for 
clinical trials in the latest stage of development, we expect β2 to be positive. For our 
second hypothesis (H2), we expect β5 to be negative, reflecting a lower market 
reaction when a large firm is involved in an alliance and the clinical trials 
announcements concern the latest stage of development.   
To test our last hypothesis (H3), we adapt our main model and test it on the 
sub-sample of firms that form R&D alliances. This model writes as follows:  
CARi,t (or AVOLi,t) = λ0 + λ1Phase_IIi,t + λ2Phase_IIIi,t  + λ3Small partneri,t 




To support H3, we expect the coefficient λ5 to be negative, suggesting that the 
market reaction to Phase III announcements is smaller for alliances between a large 
and a small firm than between two large pharmaceutical firms. Such results would 
reflect the significant bargaining power of small firms that detain the specific 
knowledge (Das et al., 1998), which allows these firms to better protect themselves 
against a “hold-up” through effective contractual arrangements (Higgins, 2007). 
2.3.3. Control variables 
Following prior literature discussed in sections 2.1. and 2.2., we include several control 
variables. Size is the size of the company, measured with the natural logarithm of 
market capitalization. R&D_Intensity is defined as R&D expenses to sales.14 M_B 
captures growth opportunities of the firm and is equal to the market capitalization 
divided by the book value of equity. Leverage measures the level of debt and is 
computed as total debt to total assets. We also control for unobservable factors by 
including year fixed-effects and firm fixed-effects. Finally, our statistics are based on 
robust standard errors clustered at the firm level (White, 1980; Petersen, 2009). 
 We note that the firm fixed-effects capture non-observable characteristics of 
the twelve large pharmaceutical firms of our sample. In particular, they measure their 
willingness to develop alliances and to avoid (or favor) the extraction of private 
benefits, as well as their experience with alliances. 
 
14 To the extent that our sample includes twelve large pharmaceutical firms, we can use this 
measure of R&D intensity without any concerns of extreme values (Zhang et al., 2018). 
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2.4. Results  
2.4.1. Description of the market reaction to clinical trial announcements 
Table 3 shows the market reaction by type of announcement for our two measures of 
market reaction. The mean CAR (AVOL) is 0.51% (1.72%) for Success and -0.43% (-
0.30%) for Failures. When we split these two samples into trials in Phase_II and 
Phase_III, we find no significant differences for successes, but significant differences 
appear for failures between Phase_II and Phase_III. When we split the sample into 
clinical trials involving two firms (i.e., Alliance = 1) or just a large firm, we find a 
smaller market reaction when the large firm is involved in an alliance, which is in line 
with our second hypothesis (H2). Finally, as expected (H3), the market reaction is 
larger (and significant) only when the partner is another large firm. For alliances with 
small firms, no significant reaction is found.  
 [INSERT TABLE 3] 
2.4.2. Results for market reaction captured with CAR 
Table 4 reports our findings with cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) as a proxy of 
market reaction for successful clinical trial announcements. In Model 1, the market 
reaction is positive and significant when a large pharmaceutical firm announces 
success in Phase_II or in Phase_III. The abnormal market returns vary between 2% and 
2.6% over the three-day window (columns 1 to 3), providing support for our hypothesis 
H1. However, CAR decreases (columns 2 and 3) when the clinical trials involve another 
firm (Alliance), which supports our hypothesis H2. Investors perceive less positively 
good news in the case of alliances, probably because large firms have to share future 
cash-flows with an ally. 
[INSERT TABLE 4] 
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 Since the regressions in Model 1 provide average results, we further analyze 
two sub-samples in Models 2 and 3. Based on firms not involved in an alliance, Model 
2 supports our previous results, as the coefficient is positive and significant for the 
latest stage of drug development (Phase_III). Thus, investors positively perceive 
clinical trials developed alone by a large pharmaceutical firm. However, Model 3 shows 
non-significant coefficients of the variables Phase_II and Phase_III, but a negative 
coefficient for Small partner, as well as the interaction variable Phase_III*Small 
partner. Thus, the market reacts negatively when a large firm collaborates with a small 
firm, especially for a success in Phase_III, which does not support our third hypothesis 
(H3).  
Table 5 provides our results on CAR for announcements of failures in clinical 
trials. Model 1 shows a negative and significant market reaction for failures in the last 
stage of drug development (Phase_III), but no significant result is found for Phase_II. 
This finding supports our hypothesis H1 of a greater market reaction during later 
stages of development. The abnormal decrease of the stock price of about -1% 
suggests a weaker market reaction for failures than for successes in clinical trials. The 
coefficient of the variable Alliance is still negative and significant, implying that the 
market reacts more negatively to announcements by firms involved in an alliance, 
which supports hypothesis H2. Model 2 confirms our findings. Finally, we do not 
provide results for Model 3 because the sample size is too small (17 announcements 
of failures in the case of an alliance). Hypothesis H3 can therefore not be tested in this 
setting. 
[INSERT TABLE 5] 
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2.4.3. Results for market reaction captured with AVOL 
Table 6 shows the results for successful clinical trial announcements when the market 
reaction is captured by the abnormal trading volume (AVOL). We find similar findings 
for Model 1 with abnormal trading volume as with cumulative abnormal returns. The 
market reaction is positive and significant for Phase_II and Phase_III in columns 1 to 
3, but negative when the announcement involves an ally (Alliance). The interaction 
variables Phase_II*Alliance and Phase_III*Alliance are still not significant. 
[INSERT TABLE 6] 
 When splitting the sample, we observe a significant increase in trading volume 
in Model 2, when a large pharmaceutical firm is not involved in an alliance. If the 
announcement involves an alliance of two firms (Model 3), no significant abnormal 
trading volume is detected. Finally, column 6 indicates that investors react negatively 
when a firm collaborates with a small partner, which supports our two hypotheses 
regarding the later stages of development (H1) and the alliance (H2), but not our last 
hypothesis regarding the size of the partner (H3).  
Finally, Table 7 presents our findings for the announcements of failures. Again, 
the results with this second measure of market reaction are in line with those found 
with cumulative abnormal returns. The market reacts negatively when the failure 
involves clinical trials in Phase_III in Model 1. Finally, the coefficient of the variable 
Alliance is negative and significant in columns 2 and 3, suggesting a lower market 
reaction when firms collaborate.  
[INSERT TABLE 7] 
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2.4.4. Sensitivity tests 
We perform two additional analyses to test the robustness of our findings. The first 
one tackles the issue of opportunistic announcements of clinical trials. It is likely that 
pharmaceutical firms may strategically disclose some news (i.e., the timing and the 
nature of clinical trial announcement) to influence investors. 
To investigate this issue, we analyze the distribution of clinical trial 
announcements during the year. Figure 2 shows that good news (i.e., successes in 
clinical trials) are more frequent in June, September, and December. These peaks 
coincide with the quarterly financial disclosures. However, there is no peak for bad 
news (i.e., failures in clinical trials). If investors are aware of these facts, which is 
probable (Li et al., 2020), our results may be biased. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2] 
To better control for the strategic clinical trial announcements, we add month 
fixed-effects in our models. If there is a more important market reaction during 
specific months (i.e., the peaks in Figure 2), these variables should capture some of 
the previously observed statistical power. The (untabulated) results support all our 
previous findings. 
Our second sensitivity analysis consists of computing CAR and AVOL on a 
different event window. We thus set the window from the event day (t=0) to two days 
after the event day (t +2), and find (in untabulated tables) that our main results still 
hold. Thus, our sensitivity tests confirm and reinforce our main findings. 
2.5. Conclusion 
This paper investigates whether the existence of a R&D alliance impacts the market 
reaction to clinical trial announcements by twelve large pharmaceutical firms, and 
61 
 
whether that market reaction differs for alliances with large and with small firms. 
Based on a sample of 544 hand-collected announcements of successes (good news) 
and failures (bad news) in clinical trials during the period 2011-2017, we find a larger 
investors’ reaction in the absence of an alliance. Moreover, in the case of an alliance, 
the market reaction is larger when the partner is another large firm than when the 
partner is a small (non-listed) firm. These results hold with our two measures of 
market reaction (i.e., cumulative abnormal returns and abnormal trading volumes), 
suggesting the existence of a market consensus regarding the impact of such 
announcements (Bamber et al., 2011). 
Thus, the risk of expropriation faced by small firms is not reflected in the 
market’s reaction to clinical trial announcements by large pharmaceutical firms. We 
posit that this finding is due to the specific nature of alliances with small (non-listed) 
firms, which have an important bargaining power as they detain specific knowledge 
(i.e., the key ideas allowing the development of new drugs) and protect themselves by 
effective contractual arrangements to limit the expropriation risk (Das et al., 1998; 
Higgins et al., 2007), also known as the “hold-up” problem (Holmström and Roberts, 
1998). In other words, it seems that large firms are not perceived as “sharks” by 
investors (Katila et al., 2008; Diestre and Rajagopalan, 2012), which also supports the 
idea that large firms try to protect their reputation, by not extracting private benefits 
from the alliance, in order to attract other innovative (small) firms in the future. 
Our study is not without limitations, as it is based on R&D alliances formed by 
a limited number of large pharmaceutical firms. Future research should investigate 
announcements made by other pharmaceutical firms to better understand under which 
circumstances the “swimming with sharks” problem is perceived by investors. 
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Moreover, we were not able to collect proprietary data about the contractual 
arrangements between the two allies. Such additional information could be useful to 
better understand the market reaction. 
 Without these caveats in mind, we nevertheless hope that our study will be 
interesting for managers and boards of directors that decide to develop alliances, as 
well as for researchers who are interested in the specific benefits, costs and risks 
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Figure 1. Research and development process 
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Figure 2. Distribution of the drug development news over the year 
Figure 2 shows the monthly distribution of our 544 clinical trial announcements by twelve large 
pharmaceutical firms during the period 2011-2017. We split announcements into announcements of 
















Table 1. Description of the sample 
The sample includes 544 clinical trial announcements by twelve large pharmaceutical firms during the 
period 2011-2017. Table 1 distinguishes: (1) Success, announcement of successful clinical trial; (2) 
Failure, announcement of failure in clinical trial; (3) Alliance, announcement of a clinical trial with another 
firm; (4) No alliance, announcement of an individually developed clinical trial; (5) Large partners, in case 
of Alliance, the collaborating partner is a large pharmaceutical firm; and (6) Small partners, in case of 
Alliance, the collaborating partner is a small firm. 
  Success Failure Total 
Phase I Total 25 1 26 
 1. No alliance 16 1 17 
 2. Alliance 9 0 9 
 2.1. Large partners 2 0 2 
 2.2. Small partners 7 0 7 
Phase II Total 90 12 102 
 1. No alliance 75 9 84 
 2. Alliance 15 3 18 
 2.1. Large partners 1 0 1 
 2.2. Small partners 14 3 17 
Phase III Total 336 80 416 
 1. No alliance 249 66 315 
 2. Alliance 87 14 101 
 2.1. Large partners 22 2 24 
 2.2. Small partners 65 12 77 
TOTAL Total 451 93 544 
 1. No alliance 340 76 416 
 2. Alliance 111 17 128 
 2.1. Large partners 25 2 27 





Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
The sample includes 544 clinical trial announcements by twelve large pharmaceutical firms during the 
period 2011-2017. A detailed description of the variables can be found in Appendix C.  
Mean SD 25% Median 75% 
Panel A. Dependent variables      
CAR 0.35% 4.34% 0.31% 0.52% 0.97% 
AVOL 1.65% 7.48% 0.16% 0.27% 3.45% 
Panel B. Control variables      
Size (million USD) 118693 65239 65450 97812 163900 
RD_Expense (million USD) 5778 2404 3574 5156 8118 
R&D_Intensity 17.26% 6.33% 13.41% 16.03% 18.93% 
M_B 5.92 8.63 2.43 3.29 6.01 
Leverage 57.88% 14.63% 46.49% 57.50% 65.79% 
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Table 3. Market reaction by sub-samples 
The sample includes 544 clinical trial announcements by twelve large pharmaceutical firms during the 
period 2011-2017. A detailed description of the variables can be found in Appendix C. The statistical 
significance represents the results of two univariate tests between clinical trials in Phase_II and Phase_III, 
between Alliance and No alliance, and between Small partner and Large partner, per groups Success and 
Failure. *** and ** denote 99% and 95% levels of confidence for the Student test (for difference in means) 
and Mann-Whitney test (for difference in medians). 
 
Success Failure 
N Mean Median N Mean Median 
Panel A. Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR)  
Full sample 451 0.51% 0.72% 93 -0.43% -0.45% 
Phase_II 90 0.51% 0.64% 12 -0.31% -0.17% 
Phase_III 336 0.53% 0.65% 80 -0.59%*** -0.51%*** 
Alliance 111 0.48% 0.50% 17 -0.34% -0.28% 
No alliance 340 0.60%*** 0.77%*** 76 -0.56%*** -0.60%*** 
Small partner 86 -0.06% -0.01% 2 -0.01% -0.01% 
Large partner 25 0.74%*** 1.05%*** 15 -0.50%*** -0.47%*** 
Panel B. Abnormal trading volumes (AVOL) 
Full sample 451 1.72% 0.87% 93 -0.30% -0.12% 
Phase_II 90 1.74% 0.75% 12 -0.19% -0.04% 
Phase_III 336 1.81% 0.94%** 80 -0.48%*** -0.21%*** 
Alliance 111 1.12% 0.41% 17 -0.15% 0.06% 
No alliance 340 1.54%*** 0.63%*** 76 -0.37%*** 0.18%*** 
Small partner 86 -1.21% -0.34% 2 -1.47% -1.47% 




Table 4. Analysis of CAR in case of successful clinical trials 
The sample includes 451 announcements of success in clinical trials by twelve large pharmaceutical 
firms during the period 2011-2017. A detailed description of the variables can be found in Appendix C; 
t-statistics based on robust standard error clustered at the firm-level are presented in parentheses; *** 
and ** denote 99% and 95% levels of confidence. 
 






1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.103 0.104 0.013 0.158 0.061 0.167 
 (0.114) (0.079) (0.026) (0.114) (0.269) (0.274) 
Phase_II 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.008 0.015 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.011) 
Phase_III 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.004 0.007 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) 
Alliance  -0.052** -0.023***    
  (0.017) (0.005)    
Phase_II*Alliance   -0.008    
   (0.010)    
Phase_III*Alliance   -0.004    
   (0.003)    
Small partner      -0.031*** 
      (0.007) 
Phase_II*Small partner      -0.025 
      (0.022) 
Phase_III*Small partner      -0.019** 
      (0.007) 
Size -0.010 -0.010 -0.002 -0.015 -0.005 0.008 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.002) (0.010) (0.024) (0.024) 
R&D_Intensity -0.073 -0.075 -0.005 -0.005 -0.154 0.279** 
 (0.064) (0.076) (0.011) (0.073) (0.147) (0.126) 
M_B -0.000*** -0.000 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage 0.018 0.018 -0.007* 0.010 0.039 0.039 
 (0.014) (0.021) (0.004) (0.011) (0.063) (0.039) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 451 451 451 340 111 111 
Adj. R2 0.073 0.075 0.084 0.068 0.180 0.261 
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Table 5. Analysis of CAR in case of failure in clinical trials 
The sample includes 93 announcements of failure in clinical trials by twelve large pharmaceutical firms 
during the period 2011-2017. A detailed description of the variables can be found in Appendix C; t-
statistics based on robust standard error clustered at the firm-level are presented in parentheses; *** 
and ** denote 99% and 95% levels of confidence. 
 Model 1: Full sample Model 2: No collaboration 
1 2 3 4 
Constant 0.087 0.052 0.064** -0.015  
(0.194) (0.079) (0.024) (0.213) 
Phase_II 0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.006  
(0.008) (0.002) (0.005) (0.010) 
Phase_III -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.003** -0.008**  






















Size -0.009 -0.004 -0.004** -0.000  
(0.018) (0.007) (0.002) (0.020) 
R&D_Intensity 0.110 -0.063 -0.028*** 0.090  
(0.093) (0.036) (0.008) (0.131) 
M_B -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage 0.014 0.015 -0.014* 0.011  
(0.036) (0.012) (0.007) (0.046) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 93 93 93 76 





Table 6. Analysis of AVOL in case of successful clinical trials 
The sample includes 451 announcements of success in clinical trials by twelve large pharmaceutical firms 
during the period 2011-2017. A detailed description of the variables can be found in Appendix C; t-
statistics based on robust standard error clustered at the firm-level are presented in parentheses; *** 
and ** denote 99% and 95% levels of confidence. 
 
Model 1:  
Full sample 




1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.065 0.076 0.079 0.074 -0.170 -1.601  
(0.501) (0.130) (0.520) (0.197) (0.287) (1.013) 
Phase_II 0.050** 0.051** 0.052** 0.042 0.042 0.049  
(0.018) (0.024) (0.017) (0.027) (0.040) (0.028) 
Phase_III 0.069*** 0.071*** 0.070*** 0.065** 0.009 0.115*  




   
  
(0.000) (0.027) 




   
  
 (0.022) 




   
  
 (0.023) 




   
-0.214**   
 





   
-0.067*   
 





   
-0.109***   
 
   
(0.041) 
Size -0.020 -0.021** -0.022 -0.023 0.028* 0.143  
(0.035) (0.010) (0.036) (0.014) (0.016) (0.089) 
R&D_Intensity 0.016 0.014 0.015 0.164 0.190 0.452*  
(0.212) (0.119) (0.214) (0.169) (0.213) (0.251) 
M_B -0.002 -0.002*** -0.002 -0.003** 0.002 0.004  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
Leverage 0.233 0.232*** 0.232 0.254*** -0.420 -0.345  
(0.180) (0.058) (0.184) (0.071) (0.264) (0.215) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 451 451 451 340 111 111 




Table 7. Analysis of AVOL in case of failure in clinical trials 
The sample includes 93 announcements of failure in clinical trials by twelve large pharmaceutical firms 
during the period 2011-2017. A detailed description of the variables can be found in Appendix C; t-
statistics based on robust standard error clustered at the firm-level are presented in parentheses; *** 
and ** denote 99% and 95% levels of confidence. 
 Model 1: Full sample Model 2: No collaboration 
1 2 3 4 
Constant 1.099 0.052 0.799 1.104  
(1.374) (0.079) (0.477) (1.403) 
Phase_II -0.061 -0.002 -0.071* -0.065*  
(0.062) (0.002) (0.037) (0.033) 
Phase_III -0.056** -0.008*** -0.124*** -0.060***  






















Size -0.109 -0.004 -0.052 -0.107  
(0.132) (0.007) (0.037) (0.133) 
R&D_Intensity 0.779 -0.063 0.003 0.374  
(0.725) (0.036) (0.145) (0.515) 
M_B 0.003** -0.000* -0.003** -0.001  
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Leverage 0.297 0.015 -0.273 0.388  
(0.327) (0.012) (0.174) (0.428) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 93 93 93 76 





Appendix A. List of large sample firms  
All financial data are expressed in billions of USD for the year 2017. 
Name Country Total Assets Sales R&D 
AstraZeneca U.K. 45,26 17,25 4,16 
Bayer Germany 70,17 35,02 4,50 
Bristol Myers U.S. 31,94 20,78 4,82 
Celgene U.S. 30,14 13,00 5,92 
Eli Lilly & Company U.S. 44,98 22,87 5,28 
Glaxosmithkline U.K. 52,59 30,19 3,86 
Johnson & Johnson U.S. 150,20 76,45 10,56 
Merck & Company U.S. 87,87 40,12 9,71 
Novartis Switzerland 121,60 49,16 8,15 
Pfizer U.S. 169,90 52,55 7,66 
Roche Holding Switzerland 73,10 53,30 10,39 
Sanofi France 95,54 36,20 5,45 
76 
 
Appendix B. Examples of announcements of clinical trials 
Journal Announcement Phase Result Alliance 
02.02.2015 
(Theflyonthewall.com) 
AstraZeneca's 161-patient Phase 2b clinical trial evaluating tenapanor 
in hyperphosphatemic patients with chronic kidney disease on 
hemodialysis met its primary endpoint by demonstrating a statistically 
significant dose-related decrease in serum phosphate levels for 
tenapanor-treated patients compared to patients receiving placebo. 
Phase_II Success No 
23.08.2012 
(RTT News) 
Bristol-Myers Squibb said on Thursday that it has discontinued 
development of BMS-986094, a nucleotide polymerase inhibitor that 
was in Phase II development for the treatment of hepatitis C. 
The company had suspended the Phase II study on August 1, after an 
initial case of heart failure which subsequently resulted in death. Nine 
patients have been hospitalized to date. 
Phase_II Failure No 
05.12.2013 
(The Pharma Letter) 
Results of a 24-week Phase IIIb clinical study showed that French drug 
major Sanofi's diabetes drug Lyxumia (lixisenatide) met the primary 
endpoint of non-inferiority in blood sugar lowering (HbA1c) when 
administered either before breakfast or the main meal of the day. These 
results indicate that lixisenatide can effectively lower blood sugar at 
either time of administration. 
Phase_III Success No 
07.08.2013 
(RTT News) 
Novartis announced that results of the study of Afinitor in advanced 
liver cancer failed to meet primary endpoint of overall survival. The 
global Phase III study showed that Afinitor did not extend overall 
survival compared to placebo in patients with locally advanced or 
metastatic hepatocellular carcinoma after progression on or intolerance 
to sorafenib.  
Phase_III Failure No 
10.11.2011 
(PR Newswire) 
Sanofi and Regeneron Pharmaceuticals today announced positive 
preliminary results from the Phase 2 study program in which patients 
with elevated low-density lipoprotein cholesterol (LDL-C) were 
treated with. 
Phase_II Success Yes 
08.04.2016 
(PR Newswire) 
Eli Lilly and AstraZeneca today announced that Amaranth, a study of 
AZD3293, an oral beta secretase cleaving enzyme inhibitor currently in 
development as a potential treatment for early Alzheimer's disease, will 
continue to Phase 3 after successful Phase 2 trial. 





GlaxoSmithKline and Galapagos has again scaled back its expectations 
for an anti-inflammatory treatment, calling off any plans for late-stage 
study after a Phase II miscue dulled its potential. 
The drug, GSK2586184, is a JAK1 inhibitor developed under a long-
running partnership between the two companies, designed to treat 
lupus, ulcerative colitis and psoriasis. GSK is pulling the plug on the 
whole anti-inflammatory project, saying the treatment's overall risk-
benefit profile left it wanting after GSK2586184 performed poorly on a 
drug-interaction study with statins. 
Phase_II Failure Yes 
03.08.2011 
(Reuters News) 
Danish biopharma ALK Abello said its ragweed allergy drug showed 
good results in Phase III clinical trials conducted by its U.S.-based 
partner Merck. 
Phase_III Success Yes 
08.12.2011 
(Theflyonthewall.com) 
Bristol-Myers Squibb and AstraZeneca announced positive results from 
a Phase 3 clinical study which showed that reductions in blood sugar 
levels, or glycosylated hemoglobin levels, or HbA1c, seen at 24 weeks 
with the investigational compound dapagliflozin added to existing 
glimepiride, or sulphonylurea, therapy, compared to placebo added to 
glimepiride, were maintained at 48 weeks in adults with type 2 diabetes. 
Phase_III Success Yes 
27.06.2014 
(Reuters News) 
GlaxoSmithKline and Genmab A/S announced today that the Phase III 
study of ofatumumab versus physicians' choice in patients with bulky 
fludarabine-refractory chronic lymphocytic leukaemia did not meet its 
primary endpoint of progression free survival. 




Eli Lilly and Bristol-Myers Squibb announced that they have stopped 
enrollment in one of their two global Phase III studies evaluating 
necitumumab, an investigational anti-cancer agent. The decision to 
stop enrollment followed an independent Data Monitoring Committee 
(DMC) recommendation that no new or recently enrolled patients 
continue treatment in the trial because of safety concerns related to 
thromboembolism (blood clots) in the experimental arm of the study. 
Phas_III Failure Yes 
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PANEL A. Dependent variables 
CAR Cumulative abnormal 3-day return, centered on the earnings 
announcement date, and computed by market model. 
AVOL Abnormal volume is measured as the difference between firm 
announcement period trading and the market trading. 
PANEL B. Independent variables of interest 
Phase_II Dummy variable equal to 1 if the news relate to the Phase II of clinical 
development, and 0 otherwise. 
Phase_III Dummy variable equal to 1 if the news relate to the Phase III of clinical 
development, and 0 otherwise. 
Alliance Dummy variable equal to 1 if the news relate to the product that is 
developed with another company, and 0 otherwise. 
Small partner Dummy variable equal to 1 if the collaboration news relate to the 
product that is developed with a small company, and 0 otherwise. 
PANEL C. Control variables 
Size Natural logarithm of the firm’s market capitalization. 
R&D_Intensity R&D expenditures scaled by sales. 
M_B Market-to-book ratio, measured as the ratio of market capitalization 
to total common equity. 






Appendix D. Correlation matrix 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1) Phase_I 1.000         
          
(2) Phase_II -0.111* 1.000        
 (0.001)         
(3) Phase_III -0.410* -0.005 1.000       
 (0.000) (0.889)        
(4) Alliance 0.095* -0.080 0.002 1.000      
 (0.007) (0.021) (0.950)       
(5) Small partner -0.025 -0.140 0.129 (.) 1.000     
 (0.746) (0.063) (0.088)      
(6) Size -0.073 -0.003 0.009 -0.123* -0.010 1.000    
 (0.035) (0.934) (0.804) (0.000) (0.896)     
(7) R&D_Intensity 0.082 -0.053 -0.030 -0.048 0.334* -0.143 1.000   
 (0.018) (0.131) (0.396) (0.173) (0.000) (0.472)    
(8) M_B 0.121* -0.011 -0.025 -0.030 0.121 -0.057 0.100* 1.000  
 (0.001) (0.757) (0.474) (0.387) (0.110) (0.319) (0.004)   
(9) Leverage 0.067 0.026 -0.051 -0.081 0.057 -0.195 0.097 0.617* 1.000 
 (0.055) (0.458) (0.141) (0.020) (0.449) (0.628) (0.524) (0.000)  








Financial analysts issue target prices that help investors to make better investment 
decisions (Bradshaw, 2002; Asquith et al., 2005; Ramnath et al., 2008). However, 
academic research has shown that target prices are usually optimistic (i.e., target 
prices are higher than the future price) in a large majority of cases (Bilinski et al., 
2013; Bradshaw et al., 2013). Such a finding could be attributed to analysts’ incentives 
and conflicts of interest (Mehran and Stulz, 2007; Chan et al., 2018; Lourie, 2019), to 
improper implementation of valuation methods (Gleason et al., 2013; Green et al., 
2016), or to behavioral biases (Cen et al., 2013; Roger et al., 2018). Our paper 
contributes to the latter by investigating whether clinical trial disclosure (i.e., new and 
specific non-financial information) influences analyst optimism in the pharmaceutical 
industry.  
This paper is based on four key ideas. First, financial analysts face serious 
difficulties to value pharmaceutical firms that invest large financial resources in R&D.15 
Given that financial reports provide very little information about such investments (i.e., 
accounting standards require firms to recognize R&D expenses without any specific 
notes), investors face great uncertainty regarding the future payoffs of R&D projects. 
Thus, there is a significant risk that the actual stock prices do not reflect the 
fundamental value of pharmaceutical firms (Barth et al., 2001; Barron et al., 2002; Amir 
 
15
 The European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (2018) highlights 
that pharmaceutical firms invest more in R&D than firms from other R&D intensive industries, 




et al., 2003). To reduce that risk of mispricing, analysts must therefore collect and 
analyze additional information to that provided by financial reports. 
Second, analysts cannot easily obtain private information (i.e., earnings or cash 
flow forecasts) from managers who try to limit the proprietary costs and litigation risk 
(Guo et al., 2004; Jones, 2007; Simpson, 2010). That risk has increased after the 
adoption of new regulations (i.e., Reg. FD in the U.S. and MAD in Europe) prohibiting 
managers from revealing their private information to financial analysts (Mehran and 
Stulz, 2007; Dubois et al., 2014). Thus, analysts must consider other sources of 
information, but they face two problems. Gathering information is a costly activity, and 
analysts seek to optimize their efforts and their financial resources. In addition, some 
of the information collected may be unreliable because it is not certified by third parties 
(Dye, 2001). 
Third, the R&D process is highly standardized in the pharmaceutical industry. 
Companies have to go through three phases of drug development and information about 
these phases is publicly available on the ClinicalTrials.gov website. From a financial 
point of view, uncertainty about future payoffs decreases when a firm moves from 
Phase I to Phase II to Phase III.16 If financial analysts have sufficient expertise to 
understand this specific non-financial information, they should use it to assess the 
value of pharmaceutical firms.17  
 
16
 Phase III of clinical trials is the last phase before drug approval by the regulator. Appendix 
A and B provide more detail on the drug development process in the pharmaceutical industry. 
17
 Anecdotal evidence suggests that analysts use such non-costly non-financial information to 
value pharmaceutical firms. For instance, a report issued by Barclays indicates: “A ‘minor hit’ 
from the suspended recruitment of AstraZeneca's Phase III trial of durvalumab/AZD9291 trial 
in non-small-cell lung cancer. An update on clinicaltrials.gov shows recruitment has been 
suspended in the trial after a signal of increased incident of interstitial lung disease was seen 
in the Phase Ib trial.” 
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Fourth, psychology and behavioral economics have documented a based-rate 
fallacy, which is a tendency to ignore base-rate information (i.e., general information 
on the probability of success of clinical trials and its consequences on future cash 
flows in our case), and to focus on new and specific information (i.e., clinical trial 
disclosures in our case), rather than correctly integrating the two (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974; Bar-Hillel, 1980).18 Thus, analysts may overestimate the probability 
of success of clinical trials in Phase III, which is higher (in general) than that in Phase 
I and II, and overestimate the probability of failure in the case of clinical trials in Phase 
I, which is higher (in general) than that in Phase II and Phase III.19 In other words, 
analysts may put more weight on specific information than on base-rate information to 
make forecasts. 
Our empirical analysis is based on a sample of 20,158 target prices issued by 
221 analysts following 148 pharmaceutical firms during the period 2011-2017, and 
11,450 clinical trial disclosures. Our two main results are the following. First, Phase 
III disclosure leads to more optimistic target prices, whereas Phase I disclosure leads 
to more pessimistic target prices. This result is not sensitive to controlling for the 
probability of success of the drug portfolio, analyst following, the seasonality and 
frequency of analyst reports, and the intensity of clinical trial disclosure. Second, a 
key difference exists between large and small firms as optimistic target prices are 





 The rate-base fallacy is attributed to the representativeness heuristic (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974). The idea that individuals use new and existing information (i.e., information 
retrieved from memory) is also developed by Gennaioli and Shleifer (2010) and Bordalo et al. 
(2020). 
19
 The analysis of historical data shows that the probability of success are equal to 24% for 
Phase I, 32% for Phase II and 75% for Phase III (DiMasi, 2001). 
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by small firms. Overall, our findings suggest that target prices are biased after clinical 
trial disclosure concerning later stages of drug development (i.e., Phase II for small 
firms and Phase III for large firms). Knowing that sell-side analysts overreact to such 
new and specific non-financial information, which supports the existence of a base-
rate fallacy (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Bar-Hillel, 1980), should be of great 
interest to investors. 
Our paper contributes to the literature on analyst optimism. Several 
determinants of that optimism have already been investigated. Chan et al. (2018) and 
Lourie (2019) show that the issuance of optimistic target prices is driven by analysts’ 
incentives, but national institutions may discipline analysts (Bradshaw et al., 2019). 
Green et al. (2016) and Kim et al. (2019) highlight that analyst optimism is the result 
of the improper implementation of valuation models. Finally, optimism may reflect 
analyst behavioral biases, especially the anchoring bias (Cen et al., 2013) and the small 
price bias (Roger et al., 2018). Our paper shows that analyst optimism may also be 
driven by the misuse of new and specific non-financial information, which leads to the 
well-documented base-rate fallacy (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Bar-Hillel, 1980). 
Analysts put too much weight on specific clinical trial disclosure in Phase III (Phase I), 
which are associated with a significant decrease (increase) of uncertainty about future 
payoffs. We also contribute to the literature on non-financial disclosure (e.g., Amir et 
al., 2003; Gu and Wang, 2005; Jones, 2007; Simpson, 2010) by showing that specific 
non-financial information may substitute deficient financial reports regarding R&D 
investments. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is dedicated to 
our literature review and the development of our hypotheses. Our research design is 
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described in section 3. We present and discuss our results in section 4. A final section 
concludes. 
3.2. Prior literature and hypotheses 
We review two streams of literature. The first relates to the difficulties faced by 
analysts to issue accurate target prices for firms investing large resources in R&D, in 
a context in which limited information is provided by financial reports. The second 
stream concerns the importance of relevant and specific non-financial information that 
compensates for the deficiencies of financial statements regarding R&D. 
3.2.1. The valuation of intangible intensive firms by financial analysts 
3.2.1.1. The issuance of biased target prices 
Financial analysts contribute to the efficiency of financial markets by detecting 
mispricing and making stock recommendations to investors. More precisely, they 
compute a target price (TP), which corresponds to the fundamental value of a firm and 
compare it with the actual stock price (P). As noted by Bradshaw (2002), based on this 
comparison, they can recommend buying a stock (if TP>P, the stock is underpriced), 
holding it (if TP=P, the stock is fairly priced), or selling it (if TP<P, the stock is 
overpriced).  
To derive target prices, analysts start by collecting information from different 
sources about firms (e.g., annual reports), industries, and the (macro-)economy. All 
relevant information is then translated into earnings or cash-flow forecasts, which 
constitute the inputs of the valuation models (DCF or multiples) leading to the 
computation of a target price (Bradshaw, 2002; Asquith et al., 2005; Ramnath et al., 
2008; Gleason et al., 2013; Green et al., 2016).  
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Each analyst report therefore contains three key pieces of information: earnings 
and/or cash-flow forecasts, a target price, and a recommendation. For investors, these 
outcomes have different properties and significance. Recommendations are discrete 
and depend simultaneously on the target price and the market price of the stock.20 
Earnings or cash-flow forecasts are usually formulated for a near-term horizon and 
do not explicitly take into account changes in firm risk. Finally, the target price is 
continuous and incorporates analysts’ long-term assessment of earnings, or cash-
flows, as well as firm risk, which makes this outcome particularly interesting for 
investors (Brav and Lehavy, 2003; Bilinski et al., 2013; Bradshaw et al., 2013).  
Previous research has documented that analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock 
recommendations significantly affect stock prices. The scarce literature on the market 
consequences of target prices shows similar results (Brav and Lehavy, 2003; Asquith 
et al., 2005; Da and Schaumburg, 2011; Gleason et al., 2013; Bradshaw et al., 2013; 
Lin et al., 2016).  
This result is, however, somewhat surprising because it has been documented 
that analysts tend to issue optimistic target prices (for the U.S. market, see Brav and 
Lehavy, 2003; Asquith et al., 2005; Bradshaw et al., 2013; Roger et al., 2018; Kim et 
al., 2019; for Italy, see Bonini, 2010; for the U.K., see Demirakos et al., 2010; for 
cross-country studies, see Bilinski et al., 2013; Bradshaw et al., 2019). For instance, 
Brav and Lehavy (2003) show that the one-year-ahead target price is 28% higher than 
the current market price. Bradshaw et al. (2013) find that the implied target price-
based returns exceed actual returns by an average of 15%, and absolute target price 
 
20
 Analysts may, for instance, significantly increase the target price after including good news, 
but the actual market price may already incorporate this news, leading ultimately to no change 
in analyst recommendations. 
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forecast errors average 45%, and only 38% of target prices are met at the end of the 
12-month forecast horizon.  
Three main explanations for such optimism are proposed. First, analysts have 
specific incentives to provide biased numbers, and particularly when they work for 
banks having business relationships with the covered firms (Mehran and Stutz, 2007), 
or hold stocks of these firms (Chan et al., 2018), or are hired in near future by the 
firms they cover (Lourie, 2019). However, some other mechanisms impact analysts’ 
incentives to produce more accurate target prices, especially the institutional context 
(e.g., the legal system), as shown by Bilinski et al. (2013) and Bradshaw et al. (2019). 
Second, analysts may use imperfect valuation models or make questionable judgments 
when implementing valuation models (Demirakos et al., 2010; Gleason et al., 2013; 
Green et al., 2016). For instance, they may not adjust their inputs for unconditional 
accounting conservatism, which leads to larger errors (Kim et al., 2019). Third, analyst 
behavioral biases may also lead to the issuance of optimistic target prices. Cen et al. 
(2013) highlight an anchoring bias and Roger et al. (2018) observe a small price bias. 
Amit and Ganzach (1998) show that analysts over-react to new information. Our paper 
extends their later stream of research by considering the existence of a base-rate 
fallacy, which reflects the tendency to ignore base-rate (or general) information on 
the probability of success and failure of R&D projects, and to focus on specific and 
relevant information, rather than correctly integrating the two (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974; Bar-Hillel, 1980). 
3.2.1.2. Analyst and financial reporting deficiencies 
Financial analysts face more difficulties to perform their tasks when covering firms 
with large intangible assets (Barth et al., 2001; Barron, 2002; Amir et al., 2003; 
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Kimbrough, 2007; Palmon and Yezegel, 2012), such as pharmaceutical firms investing 
large financial and human resources in R&D. The valuation of such firms is complex 
because R&D projects have a long time horizon and are very risky. In fact, it usually 
takes about 10 years to discover new drugs, and only a few projects succeed (DiMasi 
et al. 1991; DiMasi et al., 2007), which makes the payoffs highly uncertain and difficult 
to predict (Kothari et al., 2002; Kimbrough, 2007).  
To the extent that great uncertainty is associated with R&D projects, accounting 
standard-setters consider that the fair value of such internally generated assets cannot 
be measured with sufficient reliability. Therefore, firms are required to expense R&D 
investments.21 Thus, the position of the standard setters leads to a large mismatch of 
revenues and expenses for intangible intensive firms (Lev, 2001; Barth et al., 2001; 
Kimbrough, 2007). In the absence of meaningful information in the financial statements 
regarding R&D investments, there is a substantial information asymmetry between 
managers, who have access to private information about the actual status and potential 
consequences of R&D investments, and investors or financial analysts covering 
pharmaceutical firms. These deficiencies ultimately lead to less informative stock 
prices (Aboody and Lev, 2000; Barth et al., 2001; Palmon and Yezegel, 2012). 
 In the context of possible stock mispricing, financial analysts must increase their 
effort to reduce information asymmetries by acquiring and processing additional 
information. The additional effort and costs borne by analysts may be compensated by 
 
21
 In countries applying IFRS, the capitalization of some R&D expenses is allowed under very 
precise conditions. IAS 38 indicates that an intangible asset arising from research & 
development can be capitalized if an entity can demonstrate the following criteria: (1) Technical 
feasibility of completing the intangible asset; (2) Intention to complete and use/sell the asset; 
(3) Ability to use/sell the asset; (4) Existence of a market; (5) Availability of adequate technical, 
financial, and other resources to complete the asset; (6) Cost of the asset can be measured 
reliably. In practice, only a small fraction of R&D expenses are capitalized (Dinh et al., 2019). 
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higher trading fees associated with the disclosure of relevant investment 
recommendations to investors. This idea is supported by Barth et al. (2001), who find 
higher analyst coverage for firms with more intangible assets (especially more R&D) 
relative to their industry, and for firms in industries with larger R&D expenses. 
Furthermore, Barron et al. (2002) show that analysts will supplement firms’ financial 
information by placing greater emphasis on their own private information when 
deriving their earnings forecasts, especially for high-technology manufacturing firms 
with large R&D expenditures (e.g., electronics, pharmaceuticals, and software). 
Finally, in their event study, Palmon and Yezegel (2012) show that analyst’ 
recommendation revisions are more valuable for R&D-intensive firms. The cumulative 
average abnormal returns are significantly higher for upgrades concerning firms with 
high R&D intensity. For downgrades, the difference between both groups of firms is 
also significant. Overall, these studies suggest that greater effort made by analysts 
covering firms with large R&D investments will ultimately lead to the production of 
relevant information for investors in analyst reports. 
3.2.1.3. Forecast errors  
Even if analysts make greater efforts, they may nonetheless have major difficulties to 
assimilate additional information (Amir et al., 2003; Gu and Wang, 2005). To the best 
of our knowledge, no study has yet investigated target price errors for firms with large 
R&D investments (or for intangible intensive firms), but two studies focus on earnings 
forecast errors. Amir et al. (2003) compare analysts’ forecasts for firms with and 
without R&D and show that earnings forecasts are more optimistic for companies with 
high R&D than for companies without R&D. Gu and Wang (2005) find a positive 
association between analysts’ forecast error and the firm’s intangible intensity that 
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deviates from the industry norm. Moreover, they also show greater forecast errors for 
firms with innovative technologies, because such technologies are associated with 
more uncertain prospects, but smaller errors for biotech/pharmaceutical and medical 
equipment firms that are subject to specific regulations.  
3.2.2. The disclosure of relevant and specific non-financial information 
3.2.2.1. The usefulness of non-financial information 
One may argue that additional information could be provided voluntarily by managers 
to analysts and investors, in the absence of regulation. However, that is usually not 
the case for competitive and litigation reasons (Guo, Lev, and Zhou, 2004; Jones, 2007; 
Simpson, 2010; Palmon and Yezegel, 2012). Furthermore, analysts may face three 
issues when managers disclose non-financial information about R&D projects. First, 
all relevant information would probably not be disclosed because managers have 
incentives to disclose good news and withhold bad news (Dye, 2001). Second, such 
non-audited information would not be reliable and credible. Third, processing the non-
standardized voluntary disclosure is costlier to analyze (Palmon and Yezegel, 2012), 
especially when it concerns pioneering innovations for which the economic 
consequences are difficult to estimate (Gu and Wang, 2005). Since analysts seek to 
optimize their efforts and their financial resources to perform their tasks, they prefer 
to focus on public and credible information, which is less costly to collect and to 
analyze. 
3.2.2.2. Clinical trial disclosure in the pharmaceutical industry  
In the pharmaceutical industry, which is highly regulated, the process of drug 
development is standardized, as shown in Appendix A and B. Pharmaceutical firms 
start with pre-clinical trials including animal testing. In case of success, they can start 
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clinical trials consisting of testing new drugs on human subjects to assess their 
effectiveness. There are three main phases (Phase I, II, III), which notably differ in 
terms of the number of people involved in drug testing. It usually takes about 6-7 years 
to pass these three steps. These clinical trials are registered in a database developed 
by the National Library of Medicine for the National Institute of Health, available to the 
public since 2000 (ClinicalTrials.gov). If Phase III is successful, the firm requests 
approval from the regulator to launch the new drug. Finally, the final post-development 
phase (Phase IV) consists of market monitoring (DiMasi et al., 1991; Petrova, 2014). 
A new drug advances into the next phase only if it successfully passes the previous 
phase. Thus, the probability of launching a new drug increases (i.e., uncertainty 
decreases) as it moves through different stages of clinical trials (Ely et al., 2003; 
Girotra, 2007). Disclosures about these phases reduce information asymmetry between 
managers and investors, as well as uncertainty regarding the future payoffs. Clinical 
trial disclosures are therefore very useful for analysts and investors (Ely et al., 2003; 
Girotra, 2007; Dedman et al., 2008; Hao et al., 2017).  
3.2.2.3. The usefulness of clinical trial disclosures for investors and analysts 
Some authors implement event studies to investigate the impact of new clinical trial 
disclosures on firm market value (Ely et al., 2003; Girtora et al., 2007; Dedman et al., 
2008; Szutowski, 2018). Ely et al. (2003) focus on the various stages of product 
development and find a significant market response to clinical trial announcements in 
Phase II. They conclude that Phase II is the initial point at which investors have 
sufficient confidence that a new drug has reached a minimum potential for success, 
which leads to an increase in firm market value. Girotra et al. (2007) investigate 
failures in Phase III and find a negative and economically important market reaction to 
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such announcements. However, the impact of the failure is smaller when the firm is 
developing other projects for the same market as the failed project. Dedman et al. 
(2008) show that the drug development announcements have a greater impact on the 
market value than earnings announcements. They also note that firms announce more 
good news than bad news, and more news on late stage developments than on early 
ones. This pattern of disclosure, and the subsequent market reactions, varies between 
larger firms and their smaller counterparts. Finally, Szutowski (2018) finds that the 
market reaction is sensitive to the development stage as the stock returns are higher 
when the level of advancement is low, and smaller during the launch of new drug 
production for European biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms. Overall, these papers 
show that investors revise their expectations about the future cash-flows when 
uncertainty decreases.   
To the best of our knowledge, only one paper focuses on the impact of such 
non-financial disclosure on the tasks performed by financial analysts. Hao et al. (2017) 
show that clinical trial disclosure improves earnings forecast accuracy, which suggests 
that clinical trial disclosures seem useful for assessing future payoffs of 
pharmaceutical companies.22 We deepen their results by investigating whether new 
clinical trial disclosures impact analyst optimism for pharmaceutical firms. However, 
our paper differs in three dimensions. First, we focus on target prices, which reflect 
the fundamental value of firms and, therefore, encompasses a larger set of information 
than near-term earnings forecasts, especially the long term consequences of R&D 
 
22
 Palmon and Yezegel (2012) indicate that investment banks hire analysts who possess 
industry-specific skills (e.g., many pharmaceutical analysts hold medical degrees), which allow 
them to understand scientific research, by reading publications and participating in academic 
conferences in the pharmaceutical field. Such industrial expertise helps them to better assess 
the consequences of R&D projects (i.e., the determination of the probability of success, its 
horizon, and the future payoffs expected). 
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projects and their impact on firm risk. Second, we focus on the impact of the three 
phases of clinical trials on analyst optimism and do not only consider an aggregate 
measure of drug development. Third, our research design allows us to better capture 
the causal relation between new clinical disclosures and revisions of target prices. 
3.2.3. Hypotheses 
As explained previously, clinical trial disclosures may reduce the information 
asymmetry and uncertainty about the future payoffs of the R&D project, especially 
when such disclosures concern the latest stage of drug development (Phase III). Two 
opposite arguments exist, however, regarding the impact of such relevant and specific 
non-financial disclosures on analyst optimism. On the one hand, it is possible that 
analysts formulate more accurate earnings and cash-flow forecasts when disclosures 
concern the latest phase of drug development because uncertainty is much lower and, 
therefore, it becomes easier to forecast future earnings, cash flows and stock prices.  
On the other hand, the base-rate fallacy may exist among financial analysts. 
This fallacy reflects the tendency to ignore base-rate information (i.e., general 
information on the probability of success of clinical trials and its consequences on 
future cash flows in our case), and to focus on specific and relevant information (i.e., 
specific clinical trial disclosure in our case), rather than correctly integrating the two 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Bar-Hillel, 1980).  
Behavioral economics has shown that individuals often use heuristics (i.e., 
decision-making based on simple, but imperfect, rules) in a context of uncertainty, 
which leads to errors. For instance, analysts frequently use (imperfect) multiples to 
value firms (Bradshaw et al, 2002; Asquith et al., 2005), or put too much weight on 
subjective probabilities to compute future earnings or cash flows when using the 
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discounted cash flow method to value firms (Green et al., 2016). We posit that financial 
analysts do not correctly take into account general information (based on historical 
data) regarding the probability of success and failure of clinical trials, when a firm 
announces the results of clinical trials. In this case, analysts may overestimate the 
probability of success of clinical trials in Phase III, which is usually higher than that of 
Phase I and II, and overestimate the probability of failure in the case of clinical trials 
in Phase I, which is usually higher than that of Phase II and Phase III. Thus, the 
argument of a base-rate fallacy among analysts leads us to formulate the two following 
directional hypotheses: 
H1: Analyst optimism increases when clinical trial disclosure concerns the latest 
stage of drug development (Phase III). 
H2: Analyst optimism decreases when clinical trial disclosure concerns the 
earliest stage of drug development (Phase I) 
3.3. Research design 
3.3.1. Sample 
To select our sample, we identified all pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms listed 
on the major European and U.S. markets from 2011 to 2017. We start in 2011 to dismiss 
any possible effects of the financial crisis on analyst coverage. We matched this set of 
firms with the I/B/E/S database, which includes target prices for the period of interest. 
Firms without data in I/B/E/S are excluded, as well as target prices without a 12-month 
horizon. Moreover, we omit target price reiterations, as we investigate only target 
price revisions.23 Financial data are extracted from ThomsonReuters. Finally, we used 
 
23
 Analysts do not change (i.e., reiterate) their target prices in only 5% of cases, which is in 
conformity with prior literature (Bradshaw et al., 2019). 
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ClinicalTrials.gov to track the various stages of drug development of the selected 
firms.24 ClinicalTrials.gov provides information on the treated disease, the type of 
interventions, number, age, and gender of participants, phase of the clinical trial, and 
finally the start and the completion date of the clinical trial. Appendix C provides some 
examples of clinical trial disclosure. For the purpose of our study, we are interested 
in the phase of drug development and the date of phase completion. We collected this 
information for all selected firms and kept only the completion of the phases that 
occurred during our period of interest.  
The sample selection process, which is summarized in Table 1, resulted in the 
creation of a database including 11,450 clinical trial disclosures made by 148 unique 
pharmaceutical firms, followed by 221 financial analysts who issued 20,158 target 
prices between 2011 and 2017. Table 2 reports the sample distribution by year and by 
country. 
Panel A in Table 2 shows an increase in the number of target prices and firms 
during our sample period. However, we observe a decreasing number of clinical trial 
disclosures, in total (from 2006 in 2011 to 1321 in 2017) and for each of the three 
phases. This negative trend may reflect the increased cost of drug development, which 
leads to a reduced number of products under development (DiMasi et al., 2007). As 
 
24
 ClinicalTrials.gov was created to increase transparency and public access to clinical trials as 
a result of the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA) of 1997. FDAMA 
required the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to establish a registry of 
clinical trials information for both federally and privately funded trials. NIH and FDA worked 
together to develop the database ClinicalTrials.gov, which was made available to the public in 
February 2000. Registration of clinical trial studies on ClinicalTrials.gov is regulated by Section 
801 of the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act (FDAAA) of 2007. FDAAA 801 
obligates the responsible party to register the clinical trial information on the ClinicalTrials.gov 
no later than 21 calendar days after enrolling the first human subject in the study. Moreover, 
the regulation also orders the responsible party to submit the information on clinical trial 
achievement no later than 12 months after the primary completion date of the clinical trial. 
FDAAA 801 authorizes civil monetary penalties against responsible parties who fail to comply 
with registration and/or results submission requirements.  
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expected, clinical trials in Phase I are the most frequently reported, while Phase III are 
the least reported. Panel B describes the sample distribution per country. 
[INSERT TABLE 1]  
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
3.3.2. Models 
We develop the following model to test our hypothesis:  
TP_OPTIMISMi,j,t = β0 + β1Phase_Ii,t + β2Phase_IIi,t + β3Phase_IIIi,t 
+β4RD_Salesi,t + β5LogMVi,t + β6MBi,t + β7ROAi,t + β8Leveragei,t + β9DivYieldi,t 
+ β10Volatilityi,t + β11RegQuai,t+ β12RuleLawi,t + Year_FE + Analyst_FE + ɛi,t
 (Eq. 1) 
where TP_OPTIMISM measures analyst optimism. Phase_I, Phase_II, and 
Phase_III are the number of clinical trial disclosures in the three respective phases. All 
variables are defined in the next sub-sections. Since our hypothesis states that analyst 
optimism should be greater for clinical trial disclosure concerning later phases 
(because uncertainty is reduced), we expect: β1 < β2 < β3. 
3.3.3. Target price measures 
To capture analyst optimism (TP_OPTIMISM), we follow Bradshaw et al. (2019) and 
use three different measures. To compute them, we define: TP, the target price; P0, 
the actual stock price at the target price issue date; P12, the actual stock price at the 
end of the 12-month forecast horizon.  
Our ex-ante measure of analyst optimism is the implied return (IMPLIED_RET), 
computed as (TP-P0)/P0. Our first ex-post measure of analyst optimism is the signed 
target price error (SIGNED_ERROR), calculated as (TP-P12)/P0. Our second ex-post 
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measure (MET_TP) is defined as the percentage of trading days with a TP higher than 
the stock price in the twelve months after TP forecast.25  
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics. Analysts expect an average increase 
in the stock price of 25% (with a median of 14%) within the next 12-months 
(IMPLIED_RET), which is line with previous studies (Bilinski et al., 2013; Bradshaw et 
al., 2013; Roger et al., 2018; Bradshaw et al., 2019). The average target price error 
(SIGNED_ERROR) is -3%, but the median is positive (+2%). Finally, 72% of the target 
prices are greater than the daily stock prices during the 12-month period after the 
issuance of the target price (MET_TP). 
[INSERT TABLE 3] 
3.3.4. Clinical trial disclosure 
To understand the effect of clinical trial disclosure on target prices, we define three 
variables: Phase_I, the number of disclosures of Phase I completions that occurred 
between two reports of analyst j following firm i; Phase_II, the number of disclosures 
of Phase II completions that occurred between two reports of analyst j following firm 
i; Phase_III, the number of disclosures of Phase III completions that occurred between 
two reports of analyst j following firm i. 
3.3.5. Control variables 
Based on prior literature, we include a set of control variables that could affect target 
price forecasts (Amir et al., 2003; Brav and Lehavy, 2003; Asquith et al., 2005; Gu and 
Wang, 2005; Bonini et al., 2010; Demirakos et al., 2010; Bradshaw et al., 2013; Bilinski 
 
25
 Since our paper focuses on a single industry, we no not control for the potential within-
industry risk, as suggested by Bradshaw et al. (2019). 
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et al., 2013; Roger et al., 2018; Bradshaw et al., 2019; Kim et al., 2019).26 RD_Sales is 
the ratio of R&D expenditures scaled by sales. LogMV is the natural logarithm of 
market capitalization. MB is the market-to-book ratio, equal to market capitalization 
to total equity. ROA is the operating income divided by total assets. Leverage is the 
ratio of total debt to total assets. DivYield is the ratio of dividend per share to share 
price. Volatility is the stock’s average annual price movement to a high and low from 
a mean price for each year. RegQua captures the country’s quality of policies and 
regulations. RuleLaw measures the extent of the country’s quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, and courts. We also include a set of year dummies for 
target price issue date (Year_FE), and a set of analyst dummies to control for analyst 
attributes (Analyst_FE), as Bilinski et al. (2013) and Bradshaw et al. (2013) suggest 
that some analysts have superior forecasting abilities.27 All regressions use cluster 
standard errors at the analyst level. Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics and 
Appendix D provides the description of all variables. 
3.4. Empirical results 
3.4.1. Main results 
3.4.1.1. Full sample 
Table 4 shows a positive association between disclosure concerning later stages of 
drug development (Phase II and Phase III) and our ex-ante measure of analyst optimism 
(IMPLIED_RET), but a negative association for disclosure on earlier stages of drug 
development (Phase I). Thus, analysts are more (less) optimistic when the uncertainty 
 
26
 Roger et al. (2018) argue that small price bias is an important determinant of analyst optimism. 
However, given that our sample contains only a very small fraction of observations having small 
stock prices, we do not control for the small price bias in this paper. 
27
 Bilinski et al. (2013) and Bradshaw et al. (2013) find that analyst differential and persistent 
abilities increase TP accuracy. 
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related to R&D projects is low (high). Regarding the economic impact of disclosures 
on implied returns, we find a standardized effect of -5% or -6% for Phase I (depending 
on the inclusion or not of analyst fixed-effects in our regressions), and Phase II and 
Phase III have an effect of 3% or 4%. 
 [INSERT TABLE 4] 
  With SIGNED_ERROR, analysts are also more optimistic regarding Phase II and 
Phase III announcements, and more pessimistic regarding Phase I disclosure. However, 
Phase II is economically more important than Phase III (i.e., a standardized effect of 
Phase II of 7% versus 2% for Phase III). With MET_TP, the results are similar to those 
obtained with SIGNED_ERROR. Figure 1 shows the difference in implied returns over 
the period 2011-2017 for clinical trials in Phase I, II and III. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1] 
 Overall, the main results on the full sample highlight that analysts are more 
optimistic (pessimistic) when the number of clinical trial disclosures concerning Phase 
III (Phase I) increases. Thus, this finding supports our two hypotheses. However, for 
Phase II, we find mixed results. Analyst optimism is greater (with our three measures), 
which supports the findings of Ely et al. (2003) on the importance of Phase II clinical 
trials for investor and firm market value. 
3.4.1.2. Firm size 
Our sample includes very large and small pharmaceutical firms. Our main results may 
be sensitive to firm size for two reasons. First, information asymmetry is negatively 
associated with firm size. To satisfy different investors’ needs, large pharmaceutical 
firms (with diluted ownership) disclose more information than smaller pharmaceutical 
firms (with concentrated ownership). In addition, large pharmaceutical firms already 
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have a history of drug achievement, which makes it easier for financial analysts to 
provide accurate target prices.  
To tackle this issue, we split our sample into two sub-samples based on market 
capitalization, total assets, as well as R&D expenses (PwC Strategy Innovation report, 
2017). The large companies in the pharmaceutical industry are the following: Amgen, 
AstraZeneca, Bayer, Bristol-Myers, Celgene, Eli Lilly and Company, GlaxoSmithKline, 
Gilead Sciences, Johnson & Johnson, Merck, Novartis, Novo Nordisk, Pfizer, Roche, 
Sanofi, and UCB. The other firms are considered as small pharmaceutical firms.28  
Table 5 provides results for the subsamples. For the group of large 
pharmaceutical firms, analysts are more optimistic for clinical trial disclosure 
concerning Phase III, and more pessimistic for Phase I. However, for the group of small 
firms, our results suggest that analysts are more optimistic only for Phase II disclosure, 
which supports the results of Ely et al. (2003) on the importance of Phase II for firm 
market value, especially for small non profitable firms. No significant result is found 
for Phase I and III. 
 [INSERT TABLE 5] 
3.4.2. Additional results 
3.4.2.1. Likelihood of success of clinical trials 
Prior literature highlights that clinical trial outcomes (i.e., success or failure) matter 
for investors (Ely et al., 2003; Girotra et al., 2007; Dedman et al., 2008; Szutowski, 
2018). Unfortunately, we are not able to analyze the effect of success or failure in 
clinical trials on analyst optimism because the ClinicalTrials.gov database does not 
 
28
 Table 3 shows some differences between the two sub-samples. We show more clinical trial 
disclosure and less optimistic target prices for large pharmaceutical firms. In an additional test, 
we also split our sample into three groups of equal size (i.e., large, medium, and small firms), 
and we find similar results. 
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provide clear information on this outcome. To tackle this issue, we follow Ely et al. 
(2003) and Hao et al. (2017) by considering the probability of success of a firm’s 
overall drug portfolio.  
More precisely, Ely et al. (2003) and Hao et al. (2017) construct a measure 
(DISC), which is equal to the number of clinical trials times the pre-assigned success 
weight for each phase, deflated by the total assets. They note that the success rate is 
24% for Phase I, 32% for Phase II, and 75% for Phase III. Since we focus on the number 
of clinical trial disclosures between two analyst reports, we compute Drug_Portfolio in 
the following way:  
!"#$_&'"()'*+' = 	&ℎ/01_2 ∗ 0.24 + &ℎ/01_22 ∗ 0.32 + &ℎ/01_222 ∗ 0.75	&ℎ/01_2 + &ℎ/01_22 + &ℎ/01_222  
Drug_Portfolio is the sum of the clinical trial announcements between reports 
t0 and t+1 for analyst j, where each clinical trial is weighted according to its probability 
of success, and is deflated by the number of clinical trials announced. This approach 
leads to determine the impact of the change in the probability of success of the drug 
portfolio on analyst optimism. In our main model, we therefore replace our three 
variables Phase_I, Phase_II, and Phase_III by the aggregate variable Drug_Portfolio.  
Table 6 indicates a positive and significant association between our three 
measures of analyst optimism (IMPLIED_RET, SIGNED_ERROR, and MET_TP) and 
Drug_Portfolio. The likelihood of success of a firm’s drug portfolio increases analyst 
optimism by 4.4% to 11.8%. Thus, financial analysts incorporate the likelihood of 
success for clinical trial disclosure in the target prices. Overall, this finding supports 
our main results provided in Table 4, and our hypothesis. 
[INSERT TABLE 6] 
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3.4.2.2. Analyst following 
Our main result may be driven by the fact that the number of analysts changes over 
time. More precisely, it is possible that new analysts decide to follow a firm, especially 
large firms. If such analysts possess less experience or knowledge, this may affect 
target price errors. To tackle this issue, we follow Pae and Yoon (2012) and replicate 
our main analysis on a subsample of analysts that issue at least one report every year 
for a given firm. 
 Table 7 shows that the results obtained for this subsample are qualitatively 
similar to those observed for the full sample (in Table 4). Analysts are more optimistic 
for the later phases of drug development, and more pessimistic for clinical trial 
disclosure concerning Phase_I. Overall, the concern related to analyst following does 
not change our conclusions. 
[INSERT TABLE 7] 
3.4.2.3. Seasonality and frequency of analyst reports 
Analysts may issue a new report more frequently following the announcements of 
quarterly earnings, which may lead to some seasonality issues. Figure 2 supports this 
idea. More analyst reports are issued during the first month of each quarter (i.e., 
January, April, July, October), and less reports are issued during the last month of each 
quarter (March, June, September, and December). 
 [INSERT FIGURE 2] 
 To tackle this issue of seasonality, we include month fixed effects in our 
regressions. Table 8 shows that our previous results remain unchanged for the 
Phase_I, Phase_II, and Phase_III variables with respect to TP optimism (IMPLIED_RET, 
SIGNED_ERROR, and MET_TP). 
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[INSERT TABLE 8] 
We also consider the issue of the delay between analysts’ reports by focusing 
on a sub-sample of 5,156 observations, which include analysts that issued at least two 
reports per year, within a period of 6 months. Thus, we exclude all analysts that do 
not issue a report on a regular basis. Our results in Table 9 support our hypotheses. 
[INSERT TABLE 9] 
3.4.2.4. Intensity of clinical trial disclosure 
Finally, we also investigate the distribution of the number of clinical trial disclosures 
between two analyst reports. Our full sample is composed of: (1) 5,938 cases for which 
no announcement on clinical trials was made between reports t0 and t+1 for analyst j; 
(2) 3,833 cases for which only one announcement of either Phase I, Phase II, or Phase 
III was made between reports t0 and t+1 for analyst j; and (3) 10’387 cases for which 
at least two announcements (on Phase I, Phase II, or Phase III) were made between 
reports t0 and t+1 for analyst j. We re-estimate our analysis for this last group of 
reports (i.e., many announcements only). Table 10 shows that our main results still 
hold. 
[INSERT TABLE 10] 
3.5. Conclusion  
This paper contributes to prior research showing that sell-side analysts issue 
optimistic target prices. We analyze whether the disclosure of relevant and specific 
non-financial information (i.e., clinical trial disclosure by pharmaceutical firms) 
impacts analyst optimism. In line with the well-known phenomenon called the base-
rate fallacy (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Bar-Hillel, 1980), we expect that analysts 
issue more optimistic target prices after the disclosure of information concerning the 
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latest phase of drug development (Phase III), when the probability of success is higher, 
and more pessimistic target prices for clinical trials in Phase I, when the probability of 
failure is higher. Our results support our hypotheses.  
Overall, our findings suggest that target prices are biased after the disclosure 
of specific and relevant non-financial information, which is a substitute to deficient 
annual reports regarding R&D investments by pharmaceutical firms. 
 Even if our research design is well suited to detect a causal relation between 
clinical trial disclosure and revisions of target prices, we acknowledge that other types 
of disclosure may influence our results. Future work is therefore needed to better 
understand how potential confounding events, which may not be fully captured in our 
paper, influence the association between clinical trial disclosure and analyst optimism. 
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Figure 1. Evolution of implied returns 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of implied returns (IMPLIED_RET) for clinical trials in Phase I, II, and III 
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Figure 2. Distribution of analysts’ reports 
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Table 1. Sample selection process 
Sample selection criteria 
Number of 
observations 
All pharmaceutical and biotechnological firms followed by analysts in 
I/B/E/S target price database between January 2011 and December 2017 
37’576 
Less: Target prices without a 12-month forecast horizon  (6’837) 
Less: Target prices in a different currency than stock price currency (2’605) 
Less: Observations with missing data from Worldscope (4’327) 
Less: Observations with missing data from ClinicalTrials.gov (2’783) 
Number of target price observations 21’024 
Less: Observations for which target prices did not change (866) 
Final sample of target price observations 20’158 
Number of firms 148 
Number of analysts 221 







Table 2. Sample distribution 
TP stands for the number of target prices; # of Firms is the number of unique firms; # of Analysts is the 
number of unique analysts; # of Phase I denotes the number of Phase I disclosures; # of Phase II denotes 
the number of Phase II disclosures; and # of Phase III denotes the number of Phase III disclosures. 
Panel A. Sample distribution per year 






# of Phase 
I 
# of Phase 
II 
# of Phase 
III 
2011 2’364 97 132 803 675 528 
2012 2’352 90 130 690 589 513 
2013 3’178 106 120 615 537 529 
2014 2’840 121 121 652 542 519 
2015 2’920 123 116 521 474 470 
2016 3’137 130 126 529 495 448 
2017 3’367 130 129 520 423 378 
Panel B. Sample distribution per country 
Belgium 367 2 31 77 47 65 
Denmark 2’014 7 46 171 57 154 
Finland 205 1 14 35 8 8 
France 1’264 13 60 205 289 273 
Germany 1’490 9 59 193 174 147 
Italy 205 2 14 1 10 3 
Netherlands 64 1 7 0 3 1 
Norway 63 2 3 2 6 1 
Switzerland 909 9 47 547 763 652 
U.K. 1’045 12 68 847 519 535 
U.S. 12’532 90 119 2’252 1’859 1’546 




Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for our dependent and control variables for the full sample 
(Panel A), sample of large pharmaceutical firms (Panel B), and sample of small pharmaceutical firms (Panel 
C). All the variables are defined in Appendix D. 
Panel A. Full sample      
 Mean SD 25% Median 75% 
Dependent variables      
IMPLIED_RET  0.25 0.43 0.05 0.14 0.28 
SIGNED_ERROR -0.03 0.80 -0.26 0.02 0.29 
MET_TP 0.63 0.46 0 1 1 
Control variables      
RD_Sales 0.26 0.21 0.14 0.19 0.29 
MarketValue (billions of $) 46.42 61.52 1.29 14.12 82.76 
MB 5.53 5.50 2.69 4.65 9.25 
ROA -0.01 0.36 -0.07 0.08 0.18 
Leverage 0.50 0.33 0.31 0.48 0.62 
DivYield 1.25 1.73 0 0 2.42 
Volatility 29.10 12.79 19.04 25.83 38.61 
RegQua 1.46 0.23 1.27 1.46 1.63 
RuleLaw 1.65 0.19 1.59 1.62 1.65 
Panel B. Large pharmaceutical firms      
Dependent variables      
IMPLIED_RET  0.13 0.19 0.05 0.12 0.19 
SIGNED_ERROR -0.09 0.50 -0.18 -0.00 0.16 
MET_TP 0.77 0.39 0.65 1 1 
Control variables      
RD_Sales 0.18 0.06 0.14 0.16 0.20 
MarketValue (billions of $) 112.82 60.37 67.89 103.30 139.70 
MB 6.43 8.31 2.86 4.07 7.76 
ROA 0.13 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.18 
Leverage 0.59 0.13 0.48 0.59 0.65 
DivYield 2.77 1.68 1.94 2.92 3.96 
Volatility 17.63 3.98 14.18 16.71 20.82 
RegQua 1.46 0.22 1.27 1.46 1.63 




Panel C. Small pharmaceutical firms      
Dependent variables      
IMPLIED_RET  0.29 0.46 0.05 0.17 0.36 
SIGNED_ERROR -0.05 1.17 -0.33 0.05 0.42 
MET_TP 0.56 0.48 0 1 1 
Control variables      
RD_Sales 0.38 0.21 0.18 0.36 0.62 
MarketValue (billions of $) 15.78 28.57 0.71 2.97 16.64 
MB 6.81 12.61 2.64 5.17 9.79 
ROA -0.05 0.34 -0.20 0.04 0.17 
Leverage 0.45 0.30 0.27 0.38 0.54 
DivYield 0.53 1.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Volatility 34.13 11.65 24.30 31.93 41.65 
RegQua 1.46 0.23 1.27 1.50 1.63 
RuleLaw 1.65 0.21 1.60 1.62 1.65 
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Table 4. The effect of clinical trials on target price optimism 
Table 4 shows the results for IMPLIED_RET, SIGNED_ERROR, MET_TP. All variables are described in Appendix D. St.Eff. are the standardized coefficients when 
variables are standardized so that their variances are equal to 1. Depending on specification, the model includes year and analyst fixed effects. Standard errors 
are clustered at the analyst level. *** and ** represent significance at 0.01 and 0.05 level. 
 IMPLIED RET SIGNED_ERROR MET_TP 
 Est. St.Eff. Est. St.Eff. Est. St.Eff. Est. St.Eff. Est. St.Eff. Est. St.Eff. 
Intercept 0.282**  -0.025  0.310  0.145  -2.215***  -2.212***  
  (0.016)  (0.829)  (0.456)  (0.721)  (0.180)  (0.171)  
Phase_I -0.003*** -6% -0.003*** -5% -0.005*** -4% -0.007*** -5% -0.006*** -8% -0.005*** -9% 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Phase_II 0.003*** 4% 0.002*** 3% 0.010*** 7% 0.010*** 7% 0.003*** 5% 0.002 4% 
  (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Phase_III 0.003*** 4% 0.002*** 3% 0.005** 3% 0.004** 2% 0.003*** 4% 0.003*** 2% 
  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.018)  (0.029)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
RD_Sales 0.000 3% 0.000 0% 0.000*** 4% 0.000*** 3% -0.000 -3% -0.000*** -4% 
  (0.174)  (0.790)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
LogMV -0.023*** -10% -0.012 -5% -0.021 -4% -0.010 -2% 0.133*** 6% 0.159*** 13% 
  (0.009)  (0.089)  (0.357)  (0.666)  (0.010)  (0.011)  
MB 0.000 1% 0.000 2% 0.000 0% 0.000 1% 0.000 3% 0.000 2% 
  (0.477)  (0.358)  (0.525)  (0.201)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
ROA -0.213*** -15% -0.147*** -10% -0.448*** -12% -0.312*** -9% -0.000 -2% -0.010 -3% 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.020)  (0.019)  
Leverage 0.028 2% 0.005 0% -0.197*** -5% -0.191*** -5% -0.097*** -9% -0.071*** -7% 
  (0.392)  (0.872)  (0.009)  (0.005)  (0.018)  (0.017)  
DivYield 0.012 4% 0.016** 5% 0.121*** 16% 0.157*** 21% -0.070*** -25% -0.077*** -27% 
  (0.074)  (0.025)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.007)  (0.006)  
Volatility 0.011*** 27% 0.010*** 23% 0.023*** 22% 0.021*** 20% 0.000 2% 0.004*** 11% 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.001)  
RegQua 0.055 2% 0.031 1% -1.129*** -20% -1.245*** -22% 0.544*** 26% 0.374*** 18% 
  (0.557)  (0.567)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.090)  (0.085)  
RuleLaw -0.051 -2% 0.012 -0% 0.321** 5% 0.517** 8% 0.061 3% 0.058 2% 
  (0.483)  (0.834)  (0.048)  (0.014)  (0.101)  (0.077)  
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Analyst FE NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES 
Observations 20,158 20,158 20,158 20,158 20,158 20,158 20,158 20,158 20,158 20,158 20,158 20,158 
Adj. R2 0.201 0.201 0.306 0.306 0.147 0.147 0.208 0.208 0.400 0.400 0.466 0.466 
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Table 5. The effect of clinical trials on target price optimism by comparing large and small pharmaceutical firms 
Table 5 shows the results for IMPLIED_RET, SIGNED_ERROR, MET_TP. All variables are described in Appendix D. Depending on specification, the model includes 
year and analyst fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the analyst level. *** and ** represent significance at 0.01 and 0.05 level. 
  LARGE PHARMACEUTICAL FIRMS SMALL PHARMACEUTICAL FIRMS 
  IMPLIED_RET SIGNED_ERROR MET_TP IMPLIED_RET SIGNED_ERROR MET_TP 
Intercept -0.484 -0.022 -7.246*** -6.818*** -4.054*** -3.757*** 1.341*** 0.904*** 2.334*** 2.784*** -2.460*** -2.448*** 
 (0.430) (0.898) (0.000) (0.000) (0.367) (0.394) (0.141) (0.167) (0.341) (0.418) (0.228) (0.259) 
Phase_I -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.007 -0.005 -0.015 -0.009 -0.020*** -0.018*** 
 (0.001) (0.007) (0.000) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) 
Phase_II 0.001 0.001 (0.000) (0.000) 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.023*** 0.018*** 0.060*** 0.043*** 0.011*** 0.017*** 
 (0.139) (0.299) (0.979) (0.720) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) 
Phase_III 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005 0.001 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.002 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) 
RD_Sales -0.248 -0.183 -0.413 -0.257 0.898*** 1.115*** 0.000 -0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.001 -0.001*** 
 (0.084) (0.087) (0.096) (0.287) (0.114) (0.115) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LogMV 0.059 0.020 0.421*** 0.389*** 0.306*** 0.286*** -0.094*** -0.072*** -0.118*** -0.106*** 0.157*** 0.180*** 
 (0.159) (0.175) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.023) (0.012) (0.010) (0.021) (0.023) (0.013) (0.014) 
MB 0.000 0.000 -0.011*** -0.011*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.677) (0.728) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA -0.199*** -0.204*** -0.090 -0.010 0.339*** 0.483*** -0.158*** -0.109*** -0.329*** -0.269*** -0.095*** -0.115*** 
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.446) (0.931) (0.110) (0.106) (0.037) (0.034) (0.062) (0.059) (0.033) (0.030) 
Leverage 0.407*** 0.282*** 1.564*** 1.473*** 0.144 0.141 -0.017 -0.028 -0.352*** -0.373*** -0.161*** -0.136*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.089) (0.100) (0.036) (0.035) (0.085) (0.077) (0.019) (0.017) 
DivYield -0.053*** -0.042*** 0.059*** 0.070*** -0.011 -0.018** -0.013 -0.001 -0.016 0.057 -0.087*** -0.098*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.027) (0.030) (0.011) (0.011) 
Volatility -0.010** -0.010** 0.008 0.007 0.019*** 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.016*** 0.012*** -0.003 0.000 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.257) (0.333) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
RegQua -0.371*** -0.239*** -0.415** -0.353** 1.419*** 1.200*** 0.176 0.239** -1.757*** -2.128*** 0.405*** 0.190** 
 (0.007) (0.000) (0.028) (0.039) (0.107) (0.132) (0.178) (0.103) (0.296) (0.217) (0.114) (0.093) 
RuleLaw 0.216 0.221 -0.704*** -0.696*** -2.121*** -1.953*** -0.244** -0.239*** 0.703*** 1.011*** 0.234** 0.289*** 
 (0.101) (0.067) (0.002) (0.002) (0.151) (0.162) (0.122) (0.086) (0.189) (0.225) (0.117) (0.093) 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Analyst FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Observations 3,547 3,547 3,547 3,547 3,547 3,547 16,611 16,611 16,611 16,611 16,611 16,611 
Adj. R2 0.137 0.342 0.452 0.476 0.223 0.286 0.208 0.312 0.184 0.272 0.498 0.573 
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Table 6. The effect of firm drug portfolio on target price optimism 
Table 6 shows the results for IMPLIED_RET, SIGNED_ERROR, MET_TP. All variables are described in 
Appendix D. Depending on specification, the model includes year and analyst fixed effects. Standard errors 
are clustered at the analyst level. *** and ** represent significance at 0.01 and 0.05 level. 
  IMPLIED_RET SIGNED_ERROR MET_TP 
Intercept 0.279** -0.024 0.357 0.178 -2.209*** -2.189***  
(0.117) (0.117) (0.388) (0.386) (0.174) (0.165) 
Drug_Portfolio 0.061*** 0.049*** 0.118** 0.089** 0.078*** 0.063***  
(0.017) (0.015) (0.051) (0.044) (0.013) (0.012) 
RD_Sales 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000 -0.000***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LogMV -0.023*** -0.013 -0.017 -0.007 0.135*** 0.160***  
(0.009) (0.007) (0.022) (0.024) (0.010) (0.010) 
MB 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA -0.215*** -0.148*** -0.457*** -0.319*** -0.005 -0.013  
(0.032) (0.031) (0.065) (0.054) (0.020) (0.019) 
Leverage 0.027 0.004 -0.195** -0.191*** -0.099*** -0.072***  
(0.033) (0.031) (0.075) (0.068) (0.018) (0.017) 
DivYield 0.013 0.016** 0.131*** 0.164*** -0.072*** -0.080***  
(0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.019) (0.006) (0.006) 
Volatility 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.023*** 0.021*** -0.000 0.004**  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) 
RegQua 0.052 0.023 -1.139*** -1.272*** 0.524*** 0.356***  
(0.093) (0.054) (0.191) (0.144) (0.090) (0.085) 
RuleLaw -0.053 0.014 0.318 0.532** 0.075 0.067  
(0.072) (0.056) (0.164) (0.210) (0.101) (0.075) 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Analyst FE NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Observations 20,158 20,158 20,158 20,158 20,158 20,158 
Adj. R2 0.200 0.306 0.145 0.206 0.398 0.464 
117 
 
Table 7. The effect of clinical trials on target price optimism by considering 
analysts issuing at least one report per year 
Table 7 shows the results for IMPLIED_RET, SIGNED_ERROR, MET_TP. All variables are described in 
Appendix D. Depending on specification, the model includes year and analyst fixed effects. Standard errors 
are clustered at the analyst level. *** and ** represent significance at 0.01 and 0.05 level. 
 IMPLIED_RET SIGNED_ERROR MET_TP 
Intercept -0.149 -0.261 -1.663 0.205 -2.190*** -2.761*** 
  (0.458) (0.179) (0.109) (0.834) (0.358) (0.425) 
Phase_I -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.013*** -0.015*** -0.008*** -0.007*** 
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) 
Phase_II 0.003*** 0.002** 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.004*** 0.003 
  (0.009) (0.048) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) 
Phase_III 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.004** 0.004** 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
RD_Sales 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.006*** -0.004** 
  (0.509) (0.459) (0.449) (0.898) (0.001) (0.002) 
LogMV -0.003 0.012 0.044 -0.071 0.125*** 0.154*** 
  (0.806) (0.094) (0.425) (0.219) (0.020) (0.022) 
MB 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003*** 0.003*** 
  (0.162) (0.155) (0.307) (0.269) (0.001) (0.001) 
ROA -0.199** -0.126 -0.653*** -0.255 -0.015 -0.068 
  (0.013) (0.099) (0.000) (0.179) (0.085) (0.088) 
Leverage 0.099 0.078 -0.099 -0.080 -0.187*** -0.189*** 
  (0.210) (0.226) (0.578) (0.610) (0.056) (0.059) 
DivYield -0.001 -0.005 0.171*** 0.190*** -0.047*** -0.043*** 
  (0.922) (0.677) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.010) 
Volatility 0.011 0.007 0.037*** 0.017** 0.008** 0.014*** 
  (0.054) (0.139) (0.005) (0.026) (0.004) (0.004) 
RegQua 0.141 0.032 -1.308*** -1.457*** 0.538*** 0.525*** 
  (0.282) (0.617) (0.000) (0.000) (0.101) (0.100) 
RuleLaw -0.094 -0.017 0.537*** 1.060*** 0.007 -0.144 
  (0.252) (0.828) (0.010) (0.000) (0.111) (0.104) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Analyst FE NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Observations 8,863 8,863 8,863 8,863 8,863 8,863 




Table 8. The impact of clinical trial disclosure on target price optimism by 
controlling for month fixed effects 
Table 8 shows the results for IMPLIED_RET, SIGNED_ERROR, MET_TP. All variables are described in 
Appendix D. Depending on specification, the model includes year and analyst fixed effects. Standard errors 
are clustered at the analyst level. *** and ** represent significance at 0.01 and 0.05 level.  
IMPLIED_RET SIGNED_ERROR MET_TP 
Intercept 0.268*** 0.011 0.364 0.184 -2.307*** -2.277***  
(0.099) (0.098) (0.349) (0.338) (0.187) (0.175) 
Phase_I -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005***  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Phase_II 0.002** 0.001** 0.004** 0.003* 0.003*** 0.001  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Phase_III 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.003*** 0.003***  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
RD_Sales 0.001* 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001*** -0.001***  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
LogMV -0.017** -0.009 -0.034** -0.034* 0.137*** 0.162***  
(0.007) (0.007) (0.016) (0.018) (0.010) (0.011) 
MB -0.001** -0.001** 0.001 0.001 0.001*** 0.001**  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA -0.236*** -0.171*** -0.582*** -0.390*** -0.024 -0.051  
(0.036) (0.039) (0.063) (0.066) (0.035) (0.035) 
Leverage 0.050 0.028 -0.118** -0.100** -0.154*** -0.122***  
(0.032) (0.029) (0.051) (0.044) (0.020) (0.017) 
DivYield 0.005 0.010* 0.103*** 0.133*** -0.068*** -0.076***  
(0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.013) (0.007) (0.006) 
Volatility 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.001 0.004***  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) 
RegQua 0.025 0.032 -0.975*** -1.146*** 0.535*** 0.381***  
(0.061) (0.045) (0.150) (0.132) (0.091) (0.085) 
RuleLaw -0.029 -0.005 0.383*** 0.644*** 0.084 0.063  
(0.060) (0.052) (0.126) (0.179) (0.104) (0.078) 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Analyst FE NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Observations 20,158 20,158 20,158 20,158 20,158 20,158 
Adj. R2 0.260 0.358 0.200 0.248 0.406 0.470 
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Table 9. The impact of clinical trial disclosure on target price optimism by 
considering the delay of analyst reports 
Table 9 shows the results for IMPLIED_RET, SIGNED_ERROR, MET_TP. All variables are described in 
Appendix D. Depending on specification, the model includes year and analyst fixed effects. Standard errors 
are clustered at the analyst level. *** and ** represent significance at 0.01 and 0.05 level. 
VARIABLES IMPLIED_RET SIGNED_ERROR MET_TP 
Intercept -0.763 -0.234 -4.129*** -3.841*** -7.365*** -6.621***  
(0.472) (0.263) (0.408) (0.423) (0.736) (0.629) 
Phase_I -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.004*** -0.004***  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Phase_II 0.001* 0.001 0.004** 0.003 -0.004** -0.004*  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Phase_III 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.008*** 0.005** 0.006*** 0.005***  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
RD_Sales -0.295*** -0.239*** 0.898*** 1.087*** -0.459*** -0.318**  
(0.101) (0.077) (0.113) (0.114) (0.149) (0.142) 
LogMV 0.069** 0.032* 0.306*** 0.287*** 0.438*** 0.398***  
(0.030) (0.019) (0.022) (0.024) (0.047) (0.041) 
MB 0.001 0.001 0.005*** 0.004*** -0.010*** -0.010***  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
ROA -0.149*** -0.130** 0.412*** 0.541*** -0.279** -0.228*  
(0.051) (0.051) (0.129) (0.124) (0.109) (0.117) 
Leverage 0.395*** 0.298*** 0.207* 0.235* 1.700*** 1.610***  
(0.068) (0.060) (0.121) (0.130) (0.181) (0.186) 
DivYield -0.045*** -0.035*** 0.001 -0.006 0.028*** 0.031***  
(0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) 
Volatility -0.005** -0.005** 0.021*** 0.017*** 0.002 -0.001  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
RegQua -0.415*** -0.318*** 1.414*** 1.216*** -0.398*** -0.327***  
(0.093) (0.060) (0.124) (0.157) (0.097) (0.087) 
RulefLaw 0.247** 0.248*** -2.124*** -1.994*** -0.739*** -0.733***  
(0.105) (0.092) (0.171) (0.188) (0.178) (0.177) 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Analyst FE NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Observations 5,156 5,156 5,156 5,156 5,156 5,156 
Adj. R2 0.140 0.295 0.235 0.292 0.455 0.476 
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Table 10. The impact of clinical trial disclosure on target price optimism by 
focusing on the cases of multiple disclosures 
Table 10 shows the results for IMPLIED_RET, SIGNED_ERROR, MET_TP. All variables are described in 
Appendix D. Depending on specification, the model includes year and analyst fixed effects. Standard errors 
are clustered at the analyst level. *** and ** represent significance at 0.01 and 0.05 level. 
  IMPLIED_RET SIGNED_ERROR MET_TP 
Intercept -0.431*** -0.361** -1.933*** -1.362*** 0.007 0.327*  
(0.145) (0.158) (0.518) (0.500) (0.165) (0.188) 
Phase_I -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.005*** -0.006*** 0.000 -0.000  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Phase_II 0.001 0.001 0.009*** 0.009*** -0.001 -0.000  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Phase_III 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002 0.002 0.001** 0.002**  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
RD_Sales 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000** -0.000 -0.000  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LogMV 0.020*** 0.017*** 0.075*** 0.058* 0.053*** 0.052***  
(0.005) (0.005) (0.025) (0.030) (0.007) (0.008) 
MB 0.000 0.000 -0.001** -0.001** -0.000 -0.000  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA -0.174*** -0.139*** -0.197*** -0.100 -0.114*** -0.100**  
(0.039) (0.037) (0.074) (0.081) (0.036) (0.041) 
Leverage -0.010 -0.012 0.085 0.117 0.043* 0.042  
(0.032) (0.031) (0.091) (0.088) (0.024) (0.026) 
DivYield 0.001 0.004 0.153*** 0.170*** -0.014** -0.010  
(0.007) (0.008) (0.013) (0.015) (0.007) (0.007) 
Volatility 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.035*** 0.032*** 0.004*** 0.004**  
(0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) 
RegQua -0.069 -0.059 -0.825*** -0.940*** 0.035 0.084  
(0.043) (0.051) (0.135) (0.169) (0.051) (0.054) 
RuleLaw 0.065 0.106 -0.099 0.276 -0.191** -0.243**  
(0.049) (0.084) (0.133) (0.253) (0.076) (0.100) 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Analyst FE NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Observations 10,387 10,387 10,387 10,387 10,387 10,387 
Adj. R2 0.153 0.212 0.204 0.221 0.068 0.101 
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Appendix A. Research and development process 
Pre-development Development Post-development 
Drug discovery & 
Animal testing 
Clinical trials FDA review & 
Post-market monitoring Phase 1     Phase 2     Phase 3 
3-6 years 6-7 years 0.5-2 years 
Note: This figure is adapted from Petrova (2014).  
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Appendix B. Clinical trial specificities  
Phase I Phase II Phase III 
Panel A. Phase specifications 
Number of participants 20-100 volunteers 100-500 volunteers 1000-5000 volunteers 
Goal of the study Evaluates safety 
and side effects 
Efficacy at treating the 
disease 
Larger scale efficacy and 
safety evaluation 
Panel B. Phase economics 
Part of R&D expenses ≈ 8% ≈ 15% ≈ 35% 
Mean cost (millions $) 32.28 37.69 96.09 
Transition probability 24% 32% 75% 
Adapted from: DiMasi (2001); DiMasi and Grabwoski, 2007; PhRMA Pharmaceutical Industry Profile, 2011; 








    Appendix C. Examples of clinical trial disclosures available on ClinicalTrials.gov 
Sponsor Title of the study Treated condition Drug intervention Outcome Measures Age Phase # of Patients Start Date Completion 
Date 
AstraZeneca A Single Dose PD & PK Study 
With Two Formulations of 
Abediterol in Patients With 
Asthma 
Asthma Drug: Abediterol 0.156 μg|Drug: 
Abediterol 2.5 μg|Drug: Abediterol 
0.05 μg|Other: Placebo 
Change From Baseline in Trough Forced 
Expiratory Volume in 1 Second (FEV1) 
18 Years to 75 
Years   (Adult, 
Older Adult) 
Phase 1 30 June 21, 2016 Nov. 29, 
2016 
          
Bayer Phase II Copanlisib in 
Relapsed/Refractory Diffuse 
Large B-cell Lymphoma 
(DLBCL) 
Diffuse, Large B-Cell, 
Lymphoma 
Drug: Copanlisib (Aliqopa, BAY80-
6946) 
Objective Response Rate (ORR) in Total 
Population Based on Investigator 
Assessment|ORR by CD79b Status Based on 
Investigator Assessment 
18 Years and 
older   (Adult, 
Older Adult) 
Phase 2 67 May 8, 2015 Jan. 19, 2018 
Eli Lilly and 
Company 
Evaluation of Galcanezumab in 
the Prevention of Chronic 
Migraine 
Chronic Migraine Drug: Galcanezumab|Drug: 
Placebo 
Overall Mean Change From Baseline in the 
Number of Monthly Migraine Headache Days 
(MHD)|Number of Participants With 
Reduction From Baseline ≥50%, ≥75% and 
100% in Monthly Migraine Headache Days 
18 Years to 65 
Years   (Adult, 
Older Adult) 
Phase 3 1113 November 30, 
2015 
May 3, 2021 
Guerbet Safety and Efficacy Evaluation 
of DOTAREM® in MRI of 






Drug: Dotarem (gadoterate 
meglumine)|Drug: Magnevist 
(gadopentetate dimeglumine) 
MRI Lesion Visualization (Border 
Delineation, Internal Morphology and 
Contrast Enhancement) at Patient Level for 
Both "Pre" and "Paired" Evaluation 
2 Years and 
older   (Child, 
Adult, Older 
Adult) 




Ipsen Dysport® Pediatric Lower 
Limb Spasticity Study 
Cerebral Palsy|Muscle 
Spasticity|Children 
Drug: Botulinum type A toxin 
(Dysport®)|Drug: Placebo 
Change in MAS Score in the Gastrocnemius-
soleus Complex (GSC) at the Ankle Joint of 
the (Most) Affected Lower Limb 
2 Years to 17 
Years   (Child) 
Phase 3 241 July 12, 2011 June 3, 2014 
MorphoSys Study of Fc-Optimized Anti-
CD19 Antibody (MOR00208) to 





Drug: MOR00208 (formerly 
Xmab5574) 
Overall Response Rate (ORR)|Patients 
Response Duration Evaluation by 
Hematology, Bone Marrow Aspirates or 
Biopsy, CT 
16 Years and 
older   (Child, 
Adult, Older 
Adult) 
Phase 2 22 April 17, 2013 March 28, 
2015 
Novartis Efficacy and Safety of SPA100 
(Fixed-dose Combination of 
Aliskiren/Amlodipine) in 
Patients With Essential 
Hypertension 
Essential Hypertension Drug: Aliskiren/Amlodipine 
150/2.5 mg|Drug: 
Aliskiren/amlodipine 150/5 mg 
Change From Baseline in Mean Sitting 
Diastolic Blood Pressure (msDBP) to End of 
Study (Week 8) 
20 Years and 
older   (Adult, 
Older Adult) 
Phase 3 1342 October 11, 
2010 
May 18, 2011 
Sanofi Comparison of a New 
Formulation of Insulin Glargine 
With Lantus in Patients With 
Type 1 Diabetes Mellitus on 
Basal Plus Mealtime Insulin 
Type 1 Diabetes 
Mellitus 
Drug: HOE901-U300 (new 
formulation of insulin 
glargine)|Drug: Lantus (insulin 
glargine) 
Percentage of Time in Target Plasma 
Glucose Range (4.4-7.8 mmol/L [80-140 
mg/dL]) 
18 Years to 70 
Years   (Adult, 
Older Adult) 





Appendix D. Variable definitions 
This table presents the definitions of the variables used in our study. We divide the variables into three 
categories: (1) dependent variables; (2) independent variables of interest; and (3) control variables. 
Variable Definition 
PANEL A. Dependent variables 
IMPLIED_RET The ratio of target price issued by analyst j on firm i in period t divided by the 
stock price of firm i in period t, minus 1. 
SIGNED_ERROR The difference between the target price and the actual stock price at the end of 
the 12-month forecast horizon, scaled by the stock price at the target price issue 
date. 
MET_TP The percentage of trading days that a stock price is lower than target price in the 
twelve months after target price issue date. 
PANEL B. Independent variables 
Phase_I Number of completed products in Phase I between reports t0 and t+1 of analyst j 
that follows firm i. 
Phase_II Number of completed products in Phase II between reports t0 and t+1 of analyst j 
that follows firm i. 
Phase_III Number of completed products in Phase III between reports t0 and t+1 of analyst 
j that follows firm i. 
Drug_Portfolio The sum of the clinical trial announcements between reports t0 and t+1 of analyst 
j, where each clinical trial is weighted according to its potential for success as per 
DiMasi (2001), deflated by the number of clinical trial announcements. 
PANEL C. Control variables 
RD_Sales R&D expenditures scaled by sales. 
LogMV Natural logarithm of the firm’s market capitalization. 
MB Market-to-book ratio, measured as the ratio of market capitalization to total 
common equity. 
ROA Return-to-assets, defined as operating income divided by total equity. 
Leverage Ratio of total debt to total assets. 
DivYield Ratio of dividend per share to share price. 
Volatility Measure of a stock’s average annual price movement to a high and low from a 
mean price for each year. 
RegQua Captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement 
sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. 
Ranges from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong). 
RuleLaw Captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide 
by the rules of society, and in particular, the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence. Ranges from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong). 
Year_FE Year dummies for target price issue year. 






Innovation in the pharmaceutical industry is critical for the treatment of diseases and 
improving human well-being. To produce new drugs, pharmaceutical firms engage in 
risky and long-term R&D investments.  
This thesis contributes to the debate on the determinants and consequences of 
R&D investments, by providing some insights on: 1) the influence of corporate 
governance on R&D strategy; 2) the market reaction to various strategic choices; 3) 
the reaction of financial analysts to clinical trial disclosure. 
 In the first chapter, we investigate whether the implementation of R&D 
committee at the board level impacts R&D strategy. We find a positive association 
between the existence of a R&D committee and R&D intensity, the numbers of products 
in clinical trial development, approved drugs by the regulator, and acquisitions of 
pharmaceutical firms. 
 In the second chapter, we investigate whether the existence of a R&D alliance 
impacts the market reaction to clinical trial announcements by large pharmaceutical 
firms and whether the market reaction differs for alliances with large and small firms. 
We find that R&D alliances with small firms are not perceived as beneficial to investors 
of large pharmaceutical firms, when compared with alliances with other large firms or 
with the absence of an alliance. 
In the third chapter, we investigate whether the disclosure of specific non-
financial information (i.e., clinical trial disclosure) impacts analysts’ optimism in the 
pharmaceutical industry. We find that Phase III disclosures lead to more optimistic 
target prices, whereas Phase I disclosures lead to more pessimistic target prices, 
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which suggests that target prices are biased after the disclosure of that specific non-
financial information by pharmaceutical firms. 
 This thesis provides some original results, but there are still many interesting 
topics to explore. For instance, it has been documented that the board of directors may 
influence R&D investments (e.g., Adams et al., 2010; Dalziel et al., 2011). However, 
little is known on the interaction between compensation incentives (i.e., long term 
compensation of CEOs) and monitoring of CEOs by boards of directors. Furthermore, 
the role of the chief scientific officer (CSO) could be also examined. Given that many 
pharmaceutical firms have a CSO within their top management team, it could be 
interesting to examine the influence of the CSO on the R&D strategy proposed by the 
CEO and the board of directors. Finally, it could be interesting to analyze whether 
specific characteristics of financial analysts (e.g., previous experience in a 
pharmaceutical firm, scientific background) impact their ability to forecasts earnings, 
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